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A DISCRETE AND COSMOPOLITAN MINORITY: THE LOYALISTS,
THE ATLANTIC WORLD, AND THE ORIGINS OF JUDICIAL
REVIEW
DANIEL J. HULSEBOSCH*
In The People Themselves, Larry D. Kramer contributes to the juris-
prudential revolution in which judicial review is being removed from the
center of American constitutionalism and realigned with the many devices
of popular constitutionalism that the people can use to shape constitutional
meaning. 1 Kramer is largely persuasive in showing that judicial review-
the scrutiny by ordinary judges of statutes to determine whether they are
consistent with the state or federal constitution-was not central to the
constitutionalism of the founding generation. Still, Kramer notes, the blue-
print for judicial review of legislation was largely drafted early in the
founding period. The causes of the origins of judicial review, however,
remain somewhat mysterious in his second chapter, entitled "The Origins
of Judicial Review."'2 Those origins remain mysterious outside the book,
too. Building on Sylvia Snowiss's claim that, at least before Marbury v.
Madison,3 early judicial review was a "substitute for revolution" rather
than an extension of ordinary adjudication,4 Gordon S. Wood argues that
delegates to the Philadelphia Constitutional Convention "regarded judicial
nullification of legislation with a sense of awe and wonder .... -5 Perhaps
historians and legal scholars still do. There remains no convincing account
of where judicial review came from or why it appeared in elemental form
in state courts in the 1780s.
* Professor, New York University School of Law. The author thanks the participants at the
Popular Constitutionalism Conference, Chicago-Kent College of Law, the members of the Legal His-
tory Colloquium at New York University School of Law, the members of the Early American History
Workshop at the University of Maryland, Alfred Brophy, Kevin Davis, Barry Friedman, David Golove,
and Helen Hershkoff for their comments. He also thanks Sarah Trombley for research assistance, and he
is grateful for the research support of the D'Agostino/Greenberg Fund at NYU School of Law.
1. LARRY D. KRAMER, THE PEOPLE THEMSELVES: POPULAR CONSTITUTIONALISM AND JUDICIAL
REVIEW (2004). For an analysis of Kramer's version of popular constitutionalism, see Daniel J. Hulse-
bosch, Bringing the People Back In, 80 N.Y.U. L. REV. 653 (2005) (book review).
2. KRAMER, supra note 1, at 35-72.
3. 5 U.S. (I Cranch) 137 (1803).
4. SYLVIA SNOWISS, JUDICIAL REVIEW AND THE LAW OF THE CONSTITUTION 74 (1990).
5. Gordon S. Wood, The Origins of Judicial Review Revisited, or How the Marshall Court Made
More out of Less, 56 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 787, 796 (1999).
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This essay argues that anti-antiloyalism6-by which I mean the reac-
tion of some lawyers and judges against the antiloyalist legislation passed
in the states during and just after the Revolution-created the occasion and
inspired the justifications for the earliest examples in American courts of
what is now called judicial review of legislation. Precedents existed for the
practice of courts, and especially conciliar bodies of superior jurisdictions,
reviewing the legislative outputs of inferior ones in the Anglo-American
world.7 And during the late colonial period, colonists penned countless
protests in defense of customary fundamental law, usually called the liber-
ties of Englishmen.8 These claims that ancient liberties restrained govern-
ment drew on a long Anglo-American tradition of the rule of law. 9 But the
proposition that one jurisdiction's courts could nullify the legislative output
of the highest lawmaking power in that same jurisdiction was a dubious
one throughout the early modem period and especially in the late eight-
eenth-century Anglophone world.' 0 Nonetheless, a handful of state courts
in the 1780s began to innovate upon these diverse traditions and invoked
the fundamental law of their own state constitutions or the Treaty of 1783
with Britain to minimize, revise, and even nullify state legislation targeting
6. Cf Jed Rubenfeld, The Anti-Antidiscrimination Agenda, 111 YALE L.J. 1141 (2002) (arguing
that the Rehnquist Court is following a "deeply felt but as yet poorly theorized" agenda in constitutional
litigation).
7. For conciliar review of colonial and corporate legislation, both direct review of statutes and
indirect review while bearing judicial appeals, see JOSEPH HENRY SMITH, APPEALS TO THE PRIVY
COUNCIL FROM THE AMERICAN PLANTATIONS (1950); ELMER BEECHER RUSSELL, THE REVIEW OF
AMERICAN COLONIAL LEGISLATION BY THE KING IN COUNCIL (1915); Arthur Meier Schlesinger,
Colonial Appeals to the Privy Council, 28 POL. SCI. Q. 279-97, 433-50 (1913). For arguments linking
conciliar review to judicial review, see Joseph H. Smith, Administrative Control of the Courts of the
American Plantations, 60 COLUM. L. REV. 1210, 1253 (1961) (concluding that "recurrent administra-
tive testing of colonial statutes against a 'constitutional' standard exemplified in the laws of England
helped pave the way for acceptance of the doctrine of judicial review in the new nation"); MARY S.
BILDER, THE TRANSATLANTIC CONSTITUTION: COLONIAL LEGAL CULTURE AND THE EMPIRE 186-96
(2004) (suggesting influence of Privy Council repugnancy standard on Rhode Island judicial review
case Trevett v. Weeden (1786)). For the argument that English common law courts' review of corpora-
tion by-laws and local customs provide the context for judicial review of legislation, see Philip Ham-
burger, Law and Judicial Duty, 72 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1 (2003) (arguing that English common law
courts' review of lesser courts and lesser lawmaking bodies created tradition of judicial duty to vindi-
cate higher law).
8. For a comprehensive survey of these protests, see JOHN PHILLIP REID, CONSTITUTIONAL
HISTORY OF THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION (4 vols.) (1986-93).
9. See JOHN PHILLIP REID, RULE OF LAW: THE JURISPRUDENCE OF LIBERTY IN THE
SEVENTEENTH AND EIGHTEENTH CENTURIES (2004).
10. Cf id. at 97 n.1 (observing that judicial review differentiates the American from British mani-
festations of the rule of law). For the orthodox account of Parliamentary supremacy in Great Britain, see
I WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAWS OF ENGLAND 91 (Univ. of Chi. Press 1979)
(1765) (stating that "if the [British] parliament will positively enact a thing to be done which is unrea-
sonable, I know of no power that can control it: and the examples usually alleged in support of this
sense of the rule do none of them prove, that where the main object of a statute is unreasonable the
judges are at liberty to reject it; for that would set the judicial power above that of the legislature, which
would be subversive of all government").
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loyalists and interfering with transatlantic commerce. They did so for many
reasons. A primary one was to help integrate the United States into the
Atlantic world of diplomacy, trade, and ideas.
I. JUDICIAL REVIEW AND THE REINTEGRATION OF THE UNITED STATES
INTO THE ATLANTIC WORLD
For a long time historians have known that there were several state ju-
dicial cases at the end of and just after the Revolution that prefigured judi-
cial review. Recently, these cases have helped reorient scholarly
understanding of the advent of judicial review.Il No longer do most consti-
tutional scholars believe that Chief Justice John Marshall created judicial
review in 1803. But there is no satisfying account of the early state cases
that explains why they occurred when they did or what the participants
were trying to accomplish. Understanding why at least some lawyers and
judges wanted to add judicial review to the toolbox of constitutional con-
struction can perhaps shed light on the dynamic between state legislatures
and proto-Federalist lawyers and judges in the so-called "critical period"
that Kramer sees, in the tradition of Progressive historiography, as generat-
ing a lasting struggle between legal aristocrats and the people. 12
It might also shed light on why many mainstream law professors are
wary of popular constitutionalism. These critics resist the historical claim
that judicial review was peripheral to early American constitutionalism and
the normative claim that the historical centrality of popular constitutional-
ism ought to inform modem attitudes about judicial review. To them, popu-
lar constitutionalism invites the gradual erosion of civil rights won in the
twentieth century and thus endangers the most humanitarian dimension of
American constitutionalism: the protection of "discrete and insular minori-
ties" 13 from the tyranny of the majority. 14 At this point, supporters and
critics of popular constitutionalism agree: both see judicial review as an
11. See, e.g., KRAMER, supra note 1, at 57-72; Matthew P. Harrington, Judicial Review Before
John Marshall, 72 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 51, 73-85 (2003); William Michael Treanor, Judicial Review
Before Marbury, 58 STAN. L. REV. 455 (2005).
12. For Kramer's account of constitutional developments in the 1780s, see KRAMER, supra note 1,
at 35-72. For a Progressive history of the "critical period" between the Revolution and the ratification
of the federal Constitutions, see E. WILDER SPAULDING, NEW YORK IN THE CRITICAL PERIOD, 1783-
1789 (1932).
13. This is the famous formulation of Justice Harlan Fiske Stone in United States v. Carolene
Products Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152 n.4 (1938). For an acceptance of this rationale by a scholar who was
otherwise skeptical of judicial review, see JOHN HART ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST: A THEORY OF
JUDICIAL REVIEW (1980).
14. See, e.g., L. A. Powe, Jr., Are "the People" Missing in Action (and Should Anyone Care)?, 83
TEX. L. REV. 855 (2005) (reviewing KRAMER, supra note 1).
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institution that restrains popular legislation. The key difference is that sup-
porters of popular constitutionalism believe that the framers of the Ameri-
can constitutions assumed that the people would control the construction of
those constitutions and that the people can still be trusted to make wise
decisions about the protection of minority rights. Advocates of judicial
review, on the other hand, are reluctant to commit all constitutional inter-
pretation to the people's elected representatives. Understanding the reasons
why some early Americans groped toward judicial review might help dis-
solve the binaries that dominate present debates about the nature of consti-
tutional construction that Kramer sees as having deep roots in American
constitutional culture: democracy versus aristocracy, the people versus the
lawyers, populism versus humanitarianism, majoritarianism versus rights,
and so on.
The forerunners of judicial review in state courts during the 1780s
cannot be characterized as either aristocratic or humanitarian. But neither
can they be domesticated as exercises of popular constitutionalism in new
form, a substitute for revolution. Instead, participants in these cases were
seeking a new way to achieve an old constitutional ideal that can be called
transatlantic equality: an equality of the political regimes on both sides of
the Atlantic as much, or more, than the equality of individuals with each
other on either side.15 In addition to beginning to uncover the original rea-
sons for judicial review, this search for causation should help make the
study of early American constitutionalism less provincial. 16 Most scholars
interested in popular constitutionalism do not look outside the colonies,
states, or nation, to the Atlantic world of empires from which those politi-
cal jurisdictions came. Early American constitutionalism, however, cannot
be understood outside of the larger world from which Euro-Americans
derived their constitutional languages and in which they lived and did busi-
ness before and after the Revolution.
The argument here is that these early innovations in judicial construc-
tion of the relationship between statutes and constitutions were driven
15. John Phillip Reid uses the term "isonomy" to describe the North American colonists' pursuit
of constitutional equality with Englishmen across the ocean. JOHN PHILLIP REID, CONSTITUTIONAL
HISTORY OF THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION: THE AUTHORITY OF RIGHTS 82-86 (1986). For claims of
transatlantic equality in one American colony, see DANIEL J. HULSEBOSCH, CONSTITUTING EMPIRE:
NEW YORK AND THE TRANSFORMATION OF CONSTITUTIONALISM IN THE ATLANTIC WORLD, 1664-
1830, at 90-96 (2005) [hereinafter HULSEBOSCH, CONSTITUTING EMPIRE].
16. The earliest constitutional history is necessarily transatlantic, but the conventional studies of
periods after 1776 shrink their subject's horizons, at least until the mid-twentieth century. For the latter,
see Derrick A. Bell, Jr., Brown v. Board of Education and the Interest-Convergence Dilemma, 93
HARV. L. REV. 518 (1980); MARY L. DUDZIAK, COLD WAR CIVIL RIGHTS: RACE AND THE IMAGE OF
AMERICAN DEMOCRACY (2000) (arguing that Cold War imperatives, particularly the need to appeal to
decolonizing nations, were a key factor in postwar race jurisprudence).
(Vol 81:825
A DISCRETE AND COSMOPOLITAN MINORITY
largely, though not entirely, by the plight of the loyalists. By "loyalists," I
mean those colonists who sided with the British Empire during the Revolu-
tion, including some who emigrated to Britain or other British colonies and
others who wished to remain in or to return to the United States. 17 In addi-
tion, the term also embraces royal subjects residing in Britain who had
commercial and property interests in the colonies. Together, they formed a
discrete and isolated minority, held in contempt when not hated, and an
easy target for legislative revenge.
The soft quantitative fact underlying the claim is that most of the early
state cases in which courts exercised some form of judicial review-five of
a small set of seven cases-involved loyalists who were challenging anti-
loyalist state legislation. 18 Their lawyers, many of whom soon became
known as Federalists, argued in and out of court that the problem with this
systematic abuse of the loyalist minority was that it threatened the states'
ability to reintegrate into the Atlantic world. Revenge justice satisfied local
constituencies and fitted into a long Anglo-American tradition, but it also
endangered international respect for the Union. Without that respect,
Americans would not be able to participate fully in Atlantic trade, and the
states would be vulnerable to the Atlantic empires that encircled them:
France, Spain, and Great Britain.
Claims about these cases must be modest. First, they are few in num-
ber. Relying on existing histories that have uncovered the early state cases
rather than exploring the state judicial archives for new ones, it is reason-
able to conclude that, between the Declaration of Independence in 1776
and the Philadelphia Convention in 1787, there were seven situations in
which state judges exercised judicial review or engaged in strong interpre-
tation that effectively neutralized state statutes. Five of these cases involved
loyalist defendants challenging antiloyalist laws, including the first four
instances. Two others were challenges to debtor-creditor legislation; one of
17. Still useful is CLAUDE HALSTEAD VAN TYNE, THE LOYALISTS IN THE AMERICAN
REVOLUTION (1902), which contains two appendices that list most of the state antiloyalist laws, includ-
ing some in every state. See also JANICE POTTER, THE LIBERTY WE SEEK: LOYALIST IDEOLOGY IN
COLONIAL NEW YORK AND MASSACHUSETTS (1983); PHILIP RANLET, THE NEW YORK LOYALISTS (2d
ed. 2002); Oscar Zeichner, The Loyalist Problem in New York After the Revolution, 21 N.Y. HIST. 284-
302 (1940).
18. See Table, Appendix. A useful overview is CHARLES GROVE HAINES, THE AMERICAN
DOCTRINE OF JUDICIAL SUPREMACY 88-121 (2d ed. 1959). See also W. P. Trent, The Case of Josiah
Philips, I AM. HIST. REV. 444 (1896) (discussing the Virginia case of 1778); Austin Scott, Holmes v.
Walton: The New Jersey Precedent, 4 AM. HIST. REV. 456 (1899) (discussing the New Jersey case of
1780); William Michael Treanor, The Case of the Prisoners and the Origins of Judicial Review, 143 U.
PA. L. REV. 491 (1994) (analyzing the Virginia case of 1782, also known as Commonwealth v. Caton, 8
Va. (4 Call) 5 (1782)); Richard Lambert, The "Ten Pound Act" Cases and the Origins of Judicial
Review in New Hampshire, N.H. B. J., Mar. 2002, at 37 (2002); and sources cited infra Part V.
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these statutes demanded that creditors accept paper money, while the other
gave the state's courts jurisdiction to decide debt cases without a jury when
the debt claimed was ten pounds or less. 19 This is a small data set. If there
are other revolutionary era cases awaiting discovery, they could support or
qualify this thesis.
The second caution is that Anglo-American courts were just beginning
to articulate reasoned opinions. Judicial opinions exist for only a few of
these cases. Consequently, there is limited material from which to draw
conclusions about the reasoning in these cases. Early modem legal records
were designed to record the material relevant for enforcement and possible
review, not to disclose doctrinal reasoning, let alone the larger political
context and meaning of each litigation. Not all of even these records sur-
vive. To understand the context in which these cases transpired, the histo-
rian must use surrounding documents, such as lawyers' briefs when
available, along with inferential reasoning. In addition, much of the argu-
ment here depends on how contemporaries perceived these cases rather
than what they meant to the parties involved.
This relative absence of judicial reasoning is itself important: it helps
move the spotlight from judges (where most legal scholars focus) to law-
yers, and it puts more emphasis on creative advocacy than official doctrine.
The lawyers were acting like diplomats themselves and used creative legal
argument to persuade judges that they were all part of a larger world of law
whose boundaries went beyond their jurisdiction, their state, and the United
States. As such, these cases can be seen part of a larger strategy to obtain
redress for loyalists and to keep the states from interfering with interna-
tional diplomacy.
Third, the concept of an "Atlantic world" is a modem heuristic. 20 It
does, however, reflect ideas and languages current in early modem North
America. Keywords signaling that larger world included "civilization,"
"commerce," "the law of nations," "humanity," and the "respect" of the
European-based "empires."
These modest and ambiguous examples of judicial scrutiny of legisla-
tion are nonetheless significant because they reveal the original context and
method of judicial review of legislation. They also suggest the importance
for early American constitutionalism of the participants' personal experi-
ence in these cases. First, the primary effect of this early scrutiny was to
19. The New Hampshire Ten Pound Act gave rise to six cases in the state courts during 1786, but
I treat them as one case because they dealt with the single statute. See generally Lambert, supra note 18.
20. See Bernard Bailyn, The Idea of Atlantic History, 20 ITINERARIO 19 (1996) (discussing the
explanatory power of "Atlantic world" for early modem history).
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neutralize antiloyalist legislation that violated the Peace Treaty of 1783 and
the law of nations. Even the two cases not involving loyalists had ramifica-
tions for loyalist and British creditors. Second, these cases reveal that some
lawyers and judges were interested in locating hierarchies of substantive
law rather than hierarchies of jurisdiction. They were willing to entertain
horizontal review of legislatures by coordinate courts that drew on a source
of higher law, typically one originating outside that jurisdiction but often
incorporated, explicitly or implicitly, into the state's constitution. 21 These
cases are not examples of an external or conciliar body exercising a recog-
nized power to review legislation. The revolutionaries were familiar with
conciliar review of colonial statutes. Some of them, such as those in New
York, tried to duplicate this process in their Council of Revision.22 These
cases were of a different order, which is why they were controversial.
Lawyers and judges justified that horizontal review by arguing that the
courts were drawing on a superior body of law, like the common law in-
corporated into a state constitution, the law of nations, or a Confederation
treaty. They continued to embrace the colonial customary constitution of
ancient liberties, but they were also funneling it, in part and not exclu-
sively, into constitutional doctrine applied in ordinary courts. As they did
so, they were beginning to draw newly distinct lines between ordinary
common law, statutory law, and the law of the constitution, and then to
arrange those separate bodies of law in a three-level hierarchy unknown in
Britain or the colonies. In short, these lawyers and judges were groping
toward a new genre of constitutional law: a hybrid discourse of law and
politics tethered to-but existing apart from-written constitutions that
offered a structured arena in which people could struggle over the funda-
mental nature of their state. The Federalists elaborated this hierarchy of law
in the ratification debate, and then began to apply and develop it in the
courts during the 1790s. The content of each level, of course, remained
contested-and still does. The point here is that men who a few years later
embraced Federalism started to draw these lines in concrete cases involving
antiloyalist legislation. 2
3
21. There was even review by inferior courts, such as the municipal court that interpreted state
legislation in Rutgers v. Waddington, discussed infra Part V.A.I. See also Hamburger, supra note 7, at
34-38 (discussing judicial review of ten pound jurisdictional acts by New Hampshire inferior courts).
22. See HULSEBOSCH, CONSTITUTING EMPIRE, supra note 15, at 178-79 (arguing that the Council
of Revision created a "bridge" between external conciliar and internal judicial review).
23. See id. at 9-10, 203-58. I derive the idea of constitutional law as a structured "arena of strug-
gle" from Hendrik Hartog, The Constitution of Aspiration and "The Rights That Belong to Us All," in
THE CONSTITUTION AND AMERICAN LIFE 353, 366 (David Thelen ed., 1988) (arguing that "[t]he plau-
sibility... of constitutional history as an arena of struggle between contending and changing normative
orders makes it important to consider the relative constants that have channeled and structured ongoing
conflicts"). Cf WILLIAM E. NELSON, MARBURY V. MADISON: THE ORIGINS AND LEGACY OF JUDICIAL
2006]
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Third, in the small world of post-revolutionary America, these cases
provided experience for lawyers and judges to think about the nature of the
new state constitutions, the relationship of each constitution to the others,
the relationship between the state constitutions and the Articles of Confed-
eration, and finally the connection between those states and the Confedera-
tion to the larger Atlantic world of empires whence they came. Several of
them went on to become leading Federalists and served in the first federal
government. Their experience with antiloyalist legislation was part of their
constitutional education.
It was not that this group developed greater sensitivity toward discrete
and insular minorities than the average legislator. Instead, they had a cos-
mopolitan outlook on Atlantic geopolitics. From their perspective, antiloy-
alist legislation impeded the reintegration of the states into that world. In
short, the reintegration of the loyalists into the states would help facilitate
the reintegration of the United States into the Atlantic world-what at least
some considered to be civilization.24
This cosmopolitan concern for that larger world was a key motivation
behind these forerunners of judicial review and the formation of a separate
genre of constitutional law. 25 It was not a play for aristocracy or elitism in
the abstract. It was not reflexively anti-democratic. It was not driven simply
by interest. It was not just another mechanism of the sort that James Madi-
son imagined would manage the physics of a faction-ridden republic. It was
designed to elevate the United States to the level of the powers whose capi-
tals were across the Atlantic.
Much of that aspiration focused on commerce. Three-quarters of the
former colonies' trade had been with other dominions in the British Em-
pire, especially the West Indian colonies. Reestablishing that trade, along
with commercial relations with other European empires, was a key part of
the Federalist program. Interest was in play, to be sure, and another sort of
historian might now cite Immanuel Wallerstein and relate this expression
of the rule of law to international capitalism. 26 But in the eighteenth cen-
tury, commerce yielded benefits besides wealth. It was thought to encour-
age everything from good manners to peaceful and humanitarian
REVIEW 68-71 (2000) (arguing that the Marshall Court struggled to differentiate constitutional from
political decision making).
24. A suggestive study of the reintegration of loyalists in one state is DAVID EDWARD MAAS, THE
RETURN OF THE MASSACHUSETTS LOYALISTS (1989).
25. On the creation of the new genre of constitutional law, see HULSEBOSCH, CONSTITUTING
EMPIRE, supra note 15, at 207-13, 237-58.
26. See IMMANUEL WALLERSTEIN, THE MODERN WORLD-SYSTEM (3 vols.) (1974-88).
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sentiments. It reflected and sustained the highest stage of human civiliza-
tion.27
Reintegration was not, therefore, simply a diplomat's or merchant's
ploy. Playing by the rules of this Atlantic world would slow down the emi-
gration of loyalists and their capital, reopen traditional trade networks, and
attract international investment. In short, it would facilitate the circulation
of people, ideas, and credit. But the whole was worth more than the sum of
its parts. Reintegration of the American provinces into the Atlantic world
would mean, for the first time, full membership in that world. They did not
really have that before the Revolution. The failure of British administrators
to respect the liberties of Englishmen and similar indices of civilization had
enraged almost all colonists, both those who rebelled and those who did
not.28 After the Revolution, treating those who did not rebel fairly would
give all Americans entry into a club from which they had long been ex-
cluded. Consequently, the treatment of the loyalists was central to constitu-
tional debates of the 1780s.
II. THE LOYALISTS AND POPULAR CONSTITUTIONALISM
The American loyalists practiced popular constitutionalism before,
during, and after the Revolution, which supports Kramer's contention that
customary forms of redress like representation, petitions, and protests were
at the center of Anglo-American constitutionalism. Before the Revolution,
many who later remained loyal to the British Empire were leading colonial
Whigs and formulated standard arguments for colonial liberties. A good
example is William Smith, Jr., of New York. Smith was a lawyer, pamphle-
teer, and member of the colonial Assembly, and eventually chief justice of
the provincial supreme court. In the decade before the Revolution, he
penned many of the Assembly's petitions to the British government. His
petitions emphasized the colonists' equal claim to enjoy the liberties of
Englishmen, especially the right of representation, the right to jury trials,
and the right to exercise some control over colonial officials. Smith was
conflicted at the moment of decision, and throughout the war he hoped for
reconciliation. He maintained good relations with New York's revolution-
aries, many of whom had been his colleagues and partners. His old friends
who became framers of the state constitution of 1777 sent Smith-who was
within British lines and serving as an advisor to the British governor-
27. A good treatment of this ideology of commerce that traces it to the Scottish Enlightenment is
ALBERT 0. HIRSCHMAN, THE PASSIONS AND THE INTERESTS: POLITICAL ARGUMENTS FOR CAPITALISM
BEFORE ITS TRIUMPH (1977).
28. See REID, supra note 8; HULSEBOSCH, CONSTITUTING EMPIRE, supra note 15, at 105-44.
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general-a draft for his review, and he offered his comments. He finally
left New York in 1783 and became chief justice of Quebec.29
During the Revolution, most British-controlled territory in the thirteen
colonies was under martial law. Many loyalists continued to petition for the
restoration of civil government, especially the reactivation of their repre-
sentative assemblies. Once again, their discourse would have been familiar
to the revolutionaries. In October 1776, more than one thousand New
Yorkers signed a petition to the governor-general asking him to restore
trade and civil government in the city. It began as a loyalist answer to the
Declaration of Independence. They pledged "allegiance" to the king and
conceded "the Constitutional Supremacy of Great Britain over the Colo-
nies." While pledging loyalty to the Crown, the petitioners requested the
return of their assembly. The signers were not disgruntled neutrals. They
included prominent loyalists, including four members of the governor's
council, supreme court justices, the attorney general, and hundreds of other
officeholders, lawyers, and merchants. The petition had no effect.
30
During and after the war, the American loyalists used petitions, pro-
tests, and pamphlets to lobby for compensation in London and for the re-
turn of confiscated property in the United States. In London, the British
Parliament established a Commission on Loyalist Compensation that enter-
tained petitions for compensation for property lost during the Revolution
and disbursed more than 3 million pounds sterling for loss of property,
income from offices held at the time of the revolt, and actual professional
income lost, though not for the loss of expected income or trade.31 Loyal-
ists invested much time and effort publicizing their woes to members of
Parliament and the public. One pamphlet, for example, collected dozens of
New York State statutes that targeted loyalists. 32
In the new United States, loyalists petitioned legislatures for the return
of confiscated property. In New York, several obtained private bills that
ended their banishment and restored some of their property rights.
33
29. On Smith, see HULSEBOSCH, CONSTITUTING EMPIRE, supra note 15, at 92-94, 166-68.
30. See R.W.G. Vail, The Loyalist Declaration of Dependence of November 28, 1776, 31 N.Y.
HIST. Soc'Y Q. 68 (1947) (discussing and reproducing the petition).
31. See WALLACE BROWN, THE GOOD AMERICANS: THE LOYALISTS IN THE AMERICAN
REVOLUTION 188 (1969); JOHN EARDLEY-WILMOT, HISTORICAL VIEW OF THE COMMISSION FOR
ENQUIRING INTO THE LOSSES, SERVICES, AND CLAIMS, OF THE AMERICAN LOYALISTS, AT THE CLOSE
OF THE WAR BETWEEN GREAT BRITAIN AND HER COLONIES, IN 1783 (Gregg Press 1972) (1815) (mem-
oir of claims process by commission member).
32. See LAWS OF THE LEGISLATURE OF THE STATE OF NEW YORK, IN FORCE AGAINST THE
LOYALISTS, AND AFFECTING THE TRADE OF GREAT BRITAIN, AND BRITISH MERCHANTS, AND OTHERS
HAVING PROPERTY IN THAT STATE (London, 1786) [hereinafter LAWS AGAINST THE LOYALISTS].
33. See, e.g., Act to Preserve the Freedoms and Independence of this State, and for Other Purposes
Therein Mentioned (May 12, 1784) (permitting return of twenty-seven banished loyalists).
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In sum, the American loyalists participated fully in the customary con-
stitutionalism that Kramer describes as prevalent in North America. Al-
though they also shared much of the ideology of English liberties and
colonial protest, the important point here is that, procedurally, their consti-
tutional behavior was similar to the revolutionaries and the American foun-
ders-except that they remained loyal to the empire. They achieved
moderate success in vindicating what they saw as their constitutional liber-
ties: some compensation in London and some restitution in the United
States. Yet the loyalists were never made whole, and their plight-the sub-
ject of diplomacy and litigation into the nineteenth century-was a catalyst
for increasing the judiciary's role in defining American constitutional liber-
ties.
III. STATE ANTILOYALIST LEGISLATION
Modem scholars refer to the punitive treatment of a defeated class in a
civil war as "transitional justice": the striving by post-revolutionary leaders
to exact revenge on those who ruled before.34 In the early United States, the
Crown and its imperial agents were gone. But thousands of people re-
mained loyal, and many thousands more were neutral. A sampling of anti-
loyalist statutes from the new state of New York will provide a sense of
what transitional justice looked like in one province. The list is partial. A
more complete collection compiled by an aggrieved New York loyalist
included thirty-two statutes passed between 1778 and 1785 and ran to over
150 pages. 3
5
It is important to note at the outset that legislative antiloyalism was
not simply revenge justice or the product of irrational politics. 36 The stat-
utes are so numerous, so encompassing, and so detailed that they reveal a
systematic attempt to stigmatize the loyalists, to take their property, to tax
what remained, and to force them to settle debts cheaply. In sum, the stat-
utes reflect a conscious program of ousting loyalists and generating income
for states whose revenue sources were devastated by war. Heavy taxation
of citizens was ideologically and practically impossible; there simply was
34. See RuTI G. TEITEL, TRANSITIONAL JUSTICE (2000).
35. LAWS AGAINST THE LOYALISTS, supra note 32.
36. Typically, the revolutionary-era state legislatures are characterized as being "out of control."
See, e.g., Harrington, supra note 11, at 53. This characterization tracks that of James Madison. See
generally JAMES MADISON, The Vices of the Political System of the United States, in 9 THE PAPERS OF
JAMES MADISON 345, 348-57 (William M. E. Rachal ed., 1975). See also JACK N. RAKOVE, ORIGINAL
MEANINGS: POLITICS AND IDEAS IN THE MAKING OF THE CONSTITUTION 35-56 (1996) (describing and
seemingly accepting Madison's account of state legislation as full of "vices"); GORDON S. WOOD, THE
CREATION OF THE AMERICAN REPUBLIC 1776-1789 (1969).
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not enough economic activity to generate substantial revenue from ordinary
taxation, either. 37 Antiloyalism filled the fiscal gap.
In addition, state legislative drafters modeled their antiloyalist statutes
on English treason and related statutes. Little of what the states enacted was
new in the Anglo-American world. For centuries, English monarchs, their
councils, and Parliament had produced treason statutes, acts of attainder,
acts of sequestration, loyalty oaths, treason convictions, and so on. During
and after almost every constitutional controversy in English history, win-
ners declared losers to be traitors and expropriated their property. 38 In sum,
the burst of antiloyalist legislation in the American states cannot be dis-
missed, in Madisonian terms, as temporary legislative misjudgment. It rep-
resented a package of revolutionary justice that was customary throughout
the British Atlantic and, at least within each state, fiscally rational. 39 It is
therefore no surprise that every single state established a mechanism for
convicting loyalists of treason and confiscating their property.40 It would
have been surprising if any of the states had not done so. If there was any-
thing new in the process, it was the relative (though not complete) absence
of capital punishment for convicted traitors.41 Additionally, the British
government was ruling by martial law rather than statute law, and the mili-
tary confiscated property-from revolutionaries as well as from loyalists.
The loyalists took it from both sides: the revolutionaries saw them as ene-
mies, while the military governments did not treat them as equal Britons,
either.42
New York-where the Revolution was a civil war from the begin-
ning-is a good example. The revolutionary government's antiloyalist
program was more extensive than in the other states but not unusual in
kind. It attacked the loyalists by criminalizing their status, taking or taxing
their property, and making it difficult for them to collect debts. The first
37. For the states' financial straits, see MERRILL JENSEN, THE NEW NATION: A HISTORY OF THE
UNITED STATES DURING THE CONFEDERATION 1781-1789, at 302-12 (4th prtg. 1965).
38. Contemporary examples came after the Jacobite rebellions of 1715 and 1745. See ANNET"E
M. SMITH, JACOBITE ESTATES OF THE FORTY-FIVE 1-18 (1982) (discussing the decades-long process of
forfeiture, partial restitution, and settlement of creditor claims against confiscated estates). An overview
of medieval and early modem examples can be found in J.G. BELLAMY, THE LAW OF TREASON IN
ENGLAND IN THE LATER MIDDLE AGES (1970); JoHtN BELLAMY, THE TUDOR LAW OF TREASON: AN
INTRODUCTION (1979).
39. For a rare sympathetic account of the states in the 1780s see JENSEN, supra note 37.
40. See VAN TYNE, supra note 17, at 335-41 (listing forfeiture laws from thirteen states).
41. Although most were simply banished, several were executed. See BRADLEY CHAPIN, THE
AMERICAN LAW OF TREASON: REVOLUTIONARY AND EARLY NATIONAL ORIGINS 29-45 (1964) (re-
counting the development of treason, its enforcement in the revolutionary states, and the reduction of its
penalties compared to England). For capital punishment after the Jacobite rebellion, see SMITH, supra
note 38, at 2 (noting that about eighty Jacobites were executed under acts of attainder).
42. See HULSEBOSCH, CONSTITUTING EMPIRE, supra note 15, at 163-64.
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step in most states was to pass statutes that distinguished patriots from
enemies and required the latter to move behind enemy lines. The New York
legislature did so in 1776 and 1778. 43 In 1779, the state created loyalty
oaths for those who wished to practice law; then it did the same for all vot-
ers and officeholders.44 In 1784-after the Peace Treaty-the legislature
passed a law declaring, that all who remained within British lines could be
convicted of misprision of treason (a misdemeanor offense for failing to
report the treason of others) and thus disabled them from voting or holding
office.
4 5
Loyalist real property was another target. In 1779, the legislature
passed a confiscation act in which fifty-nine prominent loyalists were at-
tainted, that is, convicted of treason by statute, and their land was for-
feited. 46 The state constitution of 1777 had declared that "no acts of
attainder shall be passed by the legislature of this state, for crimes other
than those committed before the termination of the present war." 47 In the
meantime, loyalists were fair game. The act also established a commission
on forfeitures to take and redistribute that land and the land of others con-
victed of loyalty to the Crown. In the spring of 1784, more than six months
after the final Peace Treaty in which the Confederation forbade future con-
fiscations and encouraged the states to pay restitution for those in the past,
the state passed two forfeiture acts to expedite the sale of confiscated
land.4 8 The Forfeiture Commission generated state revenue for a decade.4 9
Loyalist personal property suffered, too. In 1782, the assembly passed
a debt act that absolved debtors owing money to people who were within
the British lines from paying any interest on loans after December 1775.50
This was a moratorium on interest due loyalists for the duration of the war.
In 1783, probably after news of the provisional peace treaty with Britain
43. Act of June 30, 1778, ch. 47, 1778 N.Y. Laws 87 (attempting "more effectually to prevent the
mischiefs arising from the example and influence of persons of equivocal and suspected characters in
this state"). This act carried forward a June 1776 act of its predecessor, the revolutionary Provincial
Congress. See 1 J. PROVINCIAL CONGRESS 477 (1842).
44. Act of Oct. 9, 1779, ch. 12, 1779 N.Y. Laws 155 (providing that "attomies, solicitors and
counsellors at law ... [must] produce certificates of their attachment to the liberties and independence
of America"); Act of Mar. 26, 1781, ch. 36, 1781 N.Y. Laws 355 (providing that "all public officers and
electors, within this State, [must] take the test oath therein contained").
45. Act of May 12, 1784, ch. 66, 1784 N.Y. Laws 772.
46. Act of Oct. 22, 1779, ch. 25, N.Y. Laws 173.
47. N.Y. CONST. of 1777, art. XLI.
48. Act of Apr. 6, 1784, ch. 20, 1784 N.Y. Laws 621 (providing for "the immediate sale of certain
forfeited estates"); Act of May 12, 1784, ch. 64, 1784 N.Y. Laws 736 (providing for "the speedy sale of
the confiscated and forfeited estates").
49. See HARRY B. YOSHPE, THE DISPOSITION OF LOYALIST ESTATES IN THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT
OF THE STATE OF NEW YORK (1939).
50. Act of July 12, 1782, ch. 1, 1782 N.Y. Laws 499.
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had reached New York, the legislature passed a trespass act that enabled
displaced persons to sue those who occupied their land during the war.5 1
The key provision was that obedience to a military command could not be
invoked as a defense against trespass, thus disallowing a standard defense
under the law of nations. Basically, it created liability for military uses of
property owned by civilians who left British-controlled territory. It also
generated the case of Rutgers v. Waddington, in which Alexander Hamilton
defended a loyalist in the Mayor's Court of New York City.52
In the 1783 Peace Treaty with Great Britain, the Confederation gov-
ernment had promised to stop this revenge justice and provide restitution.
Article IV promised that the states would create no "lawful impediment" to
the collection of debts and that creditors would receive "the full value in
sterling money, of all bona fide debts."'53 Article V provided that Congress
would "earnestly" request the state legislatures to "provide for the restitu-
tion of all estates, rights and properties, which have been confiscated, be-
longing to real British subjects" as well as to those who lived within British
lines but did not bear arms.54 This was a hedge. Congress knew it had no
coercive authority over the states, but it appears that British diplomats did
not fully understand just how weak this guarantee was. Article VI provided
that there would be no future confiscations of property. 55
Both houses of the New York state legislature refused to ratify the
Peace Treaty because, they claimed, Britain had violated the law of nations
during the war. Classically, however, the point of a treaty was to terminate
such claims forever, while retaining only those listed in the treaty itself.
There was, in short, a conflict between state law, on the one hand, and Con-
federation policy and the law of nations, on the other.
IV. ANTI-ANTILOYALISM AND FEDERALISM
Some revolutionary Americans saw that antiloyalist legislation endan-
gered transatlantic relations. They responded first with the tools of popular
constitutionalism-pamphlets and protests-and then they reconstituted the
relationship between the states and the central government. Predominantly,
they stayed within the boundaries of popular constitutionalism. In the end,
these violations of the treaty contributed to the push for the new federal
51. Act of Mar. 17, 1783, ch. 31, 1783 N.Y. Laws 552.
52. For a discussion of Rutgers v. Waddington, see infra Part V.A. I.
53. Definitive Treaty of Peace Between the United States of America and his Britannic Majesty,
U.S.-Gr. Brit., art. IV, Sept. 3, 1783, 8 Stat. 80.
54. Id. at art. V.
55. Id. at art. VI.
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Constitution and its Supremacy Clause, declaring the federal Constitution,
statutes, and treaties to be the "supreme Law of the Land; and the Judges in
every State shall be bound thereby, any Thing in the Constitution or Laws
of any State to the Contrary notwithstanding. '56 As Jack Rakove observes,
the Supremacy Clause "marked an attempt to incorporate a principle of
judicial review into all the state governments by the unilateral fiat of the
Constitution. '57 He adds that the delegates to the Convention "knew that
the occasional efforts of state judges to exercise a power of judicial review
had been bitterly contested by legislatures" during the 1780s.58 The Su-
premacy Clause functioned like an amendment to each state constitution
authorizing judicial review of state legislation against the standard of fed-
eral law. What is unexplored here is the way that, before the Philadelphia
Convention, some revolutionary lawyers and judges had begun to engineer
judicial review as yet another way to counter antiloyalist statutes, and how
the Federalists, with the Supremacy Clause, incorporated that experimental
practice into the Constitution. The Supremacy Clause did not, of course,
end the matter. It only continued the debate, begun in the state courts in the
1780s, over whether and in what ways treaties were enforceable against
domestic law. 59 This debate persists today.
The Confederation's diplomats abroad were the first to disapprove of
antiloyalist legislation, because reports of such statutes in Europe were
interfering with negotiations. The problem was twofold. First, the Confed-
eration's inability to control the state governments belied the American
diplomats' claim to be representing the United States. Second, the antiloy-
alist laws seemed to violate the Peace Treaty and the law of nations. As
John Jay negotiated the final draft of the Peace Treaty in Paris, he reported
to New York's attorney general that "[y]our irregular and violent popular
proceedings and resolutions against the tories hurt us in Europe. We are
puzzled to answer the question, how it happens that, if there be settled gov-
ernments in America, the people of town and district should take upon
themselves to legislate." He reported that the "newspapers in Europe are
filled with exaggerated accounts of the want of moderation, union, order,
and government which they say prevails in our country" and concluded that
56. U.S. CONST. art. VI. For a good summary of the original understanding of the Supremacy
Clause see RAKOVE, supra note 36, at 171-77.
57. RAKOVE, supra note 36, at 175.
58. Id.
59. In 1796, the Supreme Court declared that the federal courts also had the power to apply trea-
ties as the supreme law of the land. Ware v. Hylton, 3 U.S. (3 DalI.) 199 (1796) (refusing to recognize a




"the people of America must either govern themselves according to their
respective constitutions and the confederation, or relinquish all pretensions
to the respect of other nations."'60 Men like Jay were sympathetic to some
loyalists: family, friends, and acquaintances. However, he counseled mod-
eration in order to appeal to European opinion. He reported to New York's
chancellor that
the general opinion in Europe is that [the loyalists] have reason to com-
plain, and that our country ought to manifest magnanimity with respect
to them. Europe neither knows nor can be made to believe what inhu-
man, barbarous wretches the greater part of them have been, and there-
fore is disposed to pity them more than they deserve. I hope, for my part,
that the States will adopt some principle of deciding on their cases, and it
will be a one as, by being perfectly consistent with justice and humanity,
may meet with the approbation, not only of dispassionate nations at pre-
sent, but also of dispassionate posterity hereafter. 61
It was difficult for Jay to explain to his British counterparts how local
and state governments could continue to breach treaty provisions with im-
punity. European diplomats lacked the language to understand Confedera-
tion-state relations, and so did the Americans. A sympathetic correspondent
reminded Jay that "it can hardly be expected that people will in a moment
forget was is past and suddenly return to an interchange of friendly offices
with those whom for years past they have considered as their most bitter
enemies."' 62 It had been a civil war in two dimensions: the people within
each state had divided, and some provinces had divided from the rest of the
empire. None of these relationships-each state with the loyalists, the
states with each other, and the states together with the British Empire-had
been resolved.
As with almost all of its law, Congress had only the power to encour-
age the states to obey the treaty. In May 1783, Congress resolved that the
states should adhere to the preliminary provisions of the treaty, which were
agreed to in November of 1782 and finalized in September of 1783. The
committee that drafted the resolution included future leading Federalists
60. Letter from John Jay to Egbert Benson (Sept. 12, 1783), in 3 Correspondence and Public
Papers of John Jay, http://www.columbia.edu/cu/libraries/inside/workingjay/temp2/letterpress/ Jay-
Vol3.htm (last visited May 1, 2006) [hereinafter John Jay Papers]. The Columbia University Libraries
Digital Program maintains a searchable database that contains scanned originals of much of John Jay's
correspondence. See Columbia University Libraries, John Jay Papers,
http://www.columbiaedu/cu/lweb/digital/jay/ (last visited May I, 2006).
61. Letter from John Jay to Robert R. Livingston (July 19, 1783), in 3 John Jay Papers, supra note
60.
62. Letter from Charles Thomson to John Jay (Jan. 15, 1784), in 3 John Jay Papers, supra note 60.
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such as Alexander Hamilton, Oliver Ellsworth, and James Madison.63 Di-
plomacy abroad suffered while Congress awaited the outcome of diplo-
macy at home.
Again, several states refused to ratify the treaty. In response, men like
Hamilton, Madison, and others began campaigning against the antiloyalist
legislation. They wrote pamphlets decrying those laws, supported legisla-
tion to repeal them, and fought them in the courts. These were coordinated
strategies. For example, Alexander Hamilton wrote his "Letters from Pho-
cion" in 1784 to combat proposed state legislation that would declare loyal-
ists to be aliens and to publicize some of the issues he was pleading in
Rutgers v. Waddington, a New York City Mayor's Court decision that by-
passed New York's antiloyalist Trespass Act.64 Proto-Federalists like Ham-
ilton coordinated their activities as legislators, pamphleteers, and
advocates.
Writing as "Phocion," Hamilton criticized the states for violating the
procedural and property rights of loyalists in a way that was, in his words,
not "humane." He accused New York legislators of violating the "spirit of
Whigism" in pursuit of "revenge" and "dark passions. '65 But a larger prob-
lem was that their actions interfered with international relations. The legis-
lature was
sacrific[ing] important interests to the little vindictive selfish mean pas-
sions of a few. To say nothing of the loss of territory, of the disadvantage
to the whole commerce of the union, by obstructions in the fisheries; this
state would lose an annual profit of more than [fifty thousand pounds]
from the ftirr trade.
But not to insist on possible inconveniences, there is a certain evil
which attends our intemperance, a loss of character in Europe. Our Min-
isters write that our conduct, hitherto, in this respect, has done us infinite
injury, and has exhibited us in the light of a people, destitute of govern-
ment, on whose engagements of course no dependence can be placed.66
Antiloyalist legislation was bad for New York's commerce, and it was
damaging the United States' international reputation.
James Madison also decried violations of the treaty and the law of na-
tions in his personal musings on the "Vices of the Political System of the
63. 32 JOURNALS OF THE CONTINENTAL CONGRESS, 1774-1789, at 222, 224 (Gaillard Hunt ed.,
1922) (proceedings of Apr. 1, 1783), available at http://memory.loc.gov/ammem/amlaw/lwjclink.html
(follow "Volume 24 (pp. 1-528)" hyperlink; then follow "Page image" hyperlink).
64. Letter from Phocion to the Considerate Citizens of New York (Jan. 1-27, 1784), in 3 THE
PAPERS OF ALEXANDER HAMILTON 483-97 (Harold C. Syrett & Jacob E. Cooke eds., 1962) [hereinaf-
ter 3 HAMILTON PAPERS]; See also Second Letter from Phocion (April 1784), in 3 HAMILTON PAPERS,
supra, at 530-58.
65. Letter from Phocion to the Considerate Citizens of New York, supra note 64, at 484.
66. Id. at 492.
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United States." He attributed such violations to the sociology of the state
legislatures: the representatives were simply drawn from a "sphere of life"
in which international affairs were ignored. 67 Similarly, paper money
schemes were the products of parochial minds. "Is it to be imagined," he
asked, "that an ordinary citizen or even an assemblyman of R[hode] Island
in estimating the policy of paper money, ever considered or cared in what
light the measure would be viewed in France or Holland; or even in
M[assachusetts] or C[onnecticut]?"
68
Madison again emphasized state violations of the law of nations at the
Philadelphia Convention. Unless prevented, they would "involve us in the
calamities of foreign wars." Reports of violations were numerous. "The
files of Congs. contain complaints already, from almost every nation with
which treaties have been formed. Hitherto indulgence has been shewn to
us. This cannot be the permanent disposition of foreign nations."'69 Treaty
violations were the first reason he listed when presenting his case for a
federal veto on state legislation.
Before, during, and after the Philadelphia Convention, Madison talked
of the "[i]njustice of laws of States," their "[m]ultiplicity," "mutability,"
and "[i]mpotence. '' 70 He also attributed much of the problem to local fac-
tions, which could be solved by enlarging the republic. Madison was a
systematic thinker who tried to find a higher level of abstraction in which
to categorize these troubles. Modem scholars who return to Madison see
primarily the latter, when for Madison the problem was a specific set of
legislative abuses at the heart of which were antiloyalist laws. Hamilton's
writing and advocacy made this clear. Kramer has demonstrated that Ham-
ilton was one of the only people-at least among those leaving written
records-who understood Madison's more abstract political science con-
ceming the optimum size of republics. 71 Hamilton, however, also under-
stood the problems that inspired these musings. He understood them from
his experience in the state legislature and as an advocate in the state courts
of New York.
The point is that whether or not most readers of Federalist No. 10
grasped how a larger polity might prevent political monopoly, all could
understand the argument that antiloyalist legislation was impeding intema-
tional commercial and diplomatic relations. That latter proposition is the
67. MADISON, supra note 36, at 349.
68. Id. at 355-56.
69. 1 THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, at 316 (Max Farrand ed., 1911)
[hereinafter FEDERAL CONVENTION RECORDS].
70. MADISON, supra note 36, at 353-58.
71. Larry D. Kramer, Madison's Audience, 112 HARV. L. REV. 611,612 (1999).
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most consistent theme in the eighty-five letters that make up The Federal-
ist.
72
V. ANTILOYALIST LEGISLATION IN THE STATE COURTS
Kramer provides a good account of most of the early cases in which
state judges groped toward judicial review of state legislation. 73 Their juris-
prudential meaning is not at all clear. "It has been argued that all of these
cases were true judicial review cases," William M. Treanor wryly notes,
"and it has also been argued that none of them were."'74 Rather than focus-
ing on the nature of the review-whether nullification, avoidance, strong
statutory interpretation-it is sufficient for present purposes to keep in
mind that all these cases involved scrutiny of state legislation against some
source of higher law. Similarly, the standard of review is not the present
concern. Instead, the important fact is that some lawyers and state judges in
the 1780s believed that courts had the power to measure state statutes
against state constitutions and Confederation law. 75 Kramer rightly argues
that these cases were only small bits of the constitutional ferment of the
1780s, that they were controversial, and that judicial review was only
gradually accepted as one of several tools of constitutional construction. 76
With the cases arising in about seven states, there were just enough to make
judicial construction of the constitution seem plausible, but not enough for
anyone to think judicial review was the central way of defining constitu-
tions. This is where the conventional wisdom on these cases rests. Missing
is an element common to most of the cases that links them to the emerging
Federalist movement: anti-antiloyalism. Five of the following seven cases
involved loyalist defendants, meaning either colonial-born loyalists or Brit-
ish subjects who came to North America during the Revolution. The other
72. This can be demonstrated by turning the page after reading The Federalist No. 10 and continu-
ing on to The Federalist No. 11. There, Hamilton wrote of the "unequalled spirit of enterprise, which
signalises the genius of the American Merchants and Navigators," the commercial and diplomatic
advantages of Union, and even the prospect of the states forming "one great American system, superior
to the controul of all trans-atlantic force or influence, and able to dictate the terms of the connection
between the old and the new world!" THE FEDERALIST No. 11, at 69, 73 (Alexander Hamilton) (Jacob
E. Cooke ed., 1961).
73. See KRAMER, supra note 1, at 93-127.
74. Treanor, supra note 11, at 473.
75. One reason for bracketing these jurisprudential issues is that they might be anachronistic
because they demand more thoughtful and consistent rationalizations of the review process than the
historical sources (and probably the historical actors could) supply. Cf KRAMER, supra note 1, at 103
(arguing that early judges only questioned statutes that were clearly unconstitutional); Treanor, supra
note 11, at 458-60 (finding varying degrees of scrutiny, which the author attributes to the different
subject matters at issue rather than the different actors and courts involved in the decisions).
76. KRAMER, supra note 1, at 93-127.
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two cases involved debtor-creditor legislation and almost all credit net-
works had transatlantic links. For convenience, these cases can be divided
into three categories: those reviewing statutes relating to real and personal
property, those reviewing statutes criminalizing loyalist status or insurrec-
tionary behavior, and those reviewing debtor-creditor statutes.
A. Property Cases
1. Rutgers v. Waddington, New York Mayor's Court (1784): Limiting the
Trespass Act of 1783
The case that best demonstrates the relationship of judicial construc-
tion of state constitutions to the larger project of reintegration into the At-
lantic world is Rutgers v. Waddington, a 1784 case in the New York City
Mayor's Court.77 Documentation for this case is unusually full. Unlike
most early state cases, the court published an opinion. Alexander Hamilton
represented the Tory defendant, and his legal papers survived and are pub-
lished.78 Hamilton's practice papers make clear that he cut his professional
teeth in the 1780s defending loyalists-both American and British Tories.
"[L]egislative folly has afforded so plentiful a harvest to us lawyers," he
wrote Gouverneur Morris, "that we have scarcely a moment to spare from
the substantial business of reaping [it]. ' '79 Private interest and political
economy went hand in hand. Hamilton could embark "on the business of
making my fortune" while contributing to what he called "the American
empire."'80 While litigating cases, he wrote essays criticizing antiloyalist
legislation as "industrious efforts to violate, the constitution of this state, to
trample the rights of the subject, and to chicane or infringe the most solemn
77. The case was heard by seven judges: Mayor James Duane, Recorder Richard Varrick, and five
members of the city council. SELECT CASES OF THE MAYOR'S COURT OF NEW YORK CITY, 1674-1784,
at 302 (Richard B. Morris, ed., 1935).
78. This is a remarkable and unusual collection of practice papers. This published version includes
Mayor James Duane's opinion. 1 THE LAW PRACTICE OF ALEXANDER HAMILTON: DOCUMENTS AND
COMMENTARY 282-419 (Julius Goebel Jr. ed., 1964) [hereinafter HAMILTON LAW PRACTICE]. For a
more extensive analysis see HULSEBOSCH, CONSTITUTING EMPIRE, supra note 15, at 194-202.
79. Letter from Alexander Hamilton to Gouvemeur Morris (Feb. 21, 1784), in 3 HAMILTON
PAPERS, supra note 64, at 512. In three years, Hamilton "handled forty-five Trespass Act suits besides
some twenty other suits under common law actions, the Confiscation Act, and the Citation Act."
HAMILTON LAW PRACTICE, supra note 78, at 525. In New York, Aaron Burr and Robert Troup also
appeared frequently in such actions, though Hamilton seems to have represented more loyalist defen-
dants than they.
80. Letter from Alexander Hamilton to Major General Nathanael Greene (June 10, 1783), in 3
HAMILTON PAPERS, supra note 64, at 376; Letter from Alexander Hamilton to George Washington
(July 3, 1787), in 4 THE PAPERS OF ALEXANDER HAMILTON 224 (Harold C. Syrett & Jacob E. Cooke
eds., 1962) [hereinafter 4 HAMILTON PAPERS].
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obligations of treaty." As he explained to the readers of one open letter,
"'Tis with governments as with individuals, first impressions and early
habits give a lasting bias to the temper and character." It was important for
America and all "mankind" that the states develop good political prac-
tices. 81
Good practices included respecting the law of nations. Hamilton relied
heavily on the law of nations to defend his client in this Trespass Act case.
His client was a British merchant who, following a military order, occupied
the New York City brewery of the plaintiff, who had fled the British-
controlled area at the outbreak of the Revolution. In his briefs, Hamilton
invoked Sir Edward Coke's ambiguous opinion in Bonham's Case that a
statute against reason was "void," but that case was not a strong precedent
for judicial review and Hamilton did not put much weight on it.82 Instead,
he argued that the law of nations was incorporated into state law by way of
the common law, which the state constitution declared "shall be and con-
tinue the law of this state, subject to such [legislative] alterations," 83 or it
was part of Confederation law and therefore trumped state law.
Under the law of nations, a military order was a valid defense to tres-
pass during wartime. The question was whether that rule or the statutory
exception to it bound the court. Hamilton put forward at least two separate
arguments for why the court should adhere to the law of nations. First, he
argued that the law of nations was federal law that bound the states. There
were in turn two reasons for this. First, the Articles of Confederation them-
selves created a federal power to control foreign relations and implied that
the states were bound to the law of nations that regulated foreign relations.
Second, the Peace Treaty implicitly adopted the law of nations granting
amnesty for all trespasses carried out under military orders, and the treaty
was likewise a federal law that bound the states.
The second argument was that the state constitution incorporated the
law of nations when it adopted the common law. Hamilton argued both that
the state legislature could not violate the law of nations and also, more
carefully, that it had not intended to do so. 84 The New York state constitu-
tion nowhere referred to the law of nations. Hamilton argued, first, that the
law of nations was part of the common law, an increasingly common claim
81. Letter from Phocion to the Considerate Citizens of New York, supra note 64, at 484; Second
Letter from Phocion, supra note 64, at 556.
82. In this draft, Hamilton cited Coke's proposition in Bonham's Case that "[a] statute against
Law and reason especially if a private statute is void." A court had the power, Hamilton asserted in
these notes, to "render [such an] act Nugatory." HAMILTON LAW PRACTICE, supra note 78, at 357-58.
83. 1 CHARLES Z. LINCOLN, THE CONSTITUTIONAL HISTORY OF NEW YORK 183 (1906).
84. HAMILTON LAW PRACTICE, supra note 78, at 382.
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in the age of Lord Mansfield but not the most crystalline one. 85 Second, he
argued that the common law reception clause in the state constitution also
incorporated the law of nations. This logic ran into the problem that the
common law reception clause also provided that the legislature could alter
the common law so received. That is what it did in the Trespass Act.
Counsel for the landowner replied to this plea with a demurrer: the
statute did not permit such a plea in justification, thus the plea was "not
sufficient in Law to bar" the plaintiffs trespass action.86 Hamilton re-
sponded by again pleading that the justification was valid and did bar the
claim. With this joinder of demurrer, the parties agreed that the case turned
on a question of law for the judges rather than the jury: whether a military
command was a valid justification for trespass. 87
In a long and loose opinion, the Mayor's Court of New York City
agreed with at least some of Hamilton's reasoning. It held that the law of
nations' amnesty rule for trespass operated in New York by force of the
"foederal compact," which "vested Congress with full and exclusive pow-
ers to make peace and war," and the Peace Treaty. The court declared "that
no state in this union can alter or abridge, in a single point, the feoderal
articles or the treaty." In addition, the state constitution recognized and
"legalized" this union. The court could not imagine that the state legislature
had knowingly violated the law of nations because it was silent about the
conflict.88 Finally, prior conciliar review of the statute (the state Council of
Revision had approved it) did not preclude judicial'examination in individ-
ual cases. Thus, the Tory defendant could plead military justification.89
Kramer argues that the decision in Rutgers fits within the traditional
power of common law courts to interpret statutes, and thus the decision was
not an exercise of judicial review in any meaningful sense. 90 Although the
court did not assert the power to set aside the statute because it conflicted
with the state constitution or some other body of law, the Trespass Act did
not leave much room for judicial interpretation. It expressly provided that
85. Hamilton cited Coke, Blackstone and Mansfield for the proposition that "[tjhejus gentium and
jus belli are part of the common law." Id. at 353. See Edward Coke, 1 THE FIRST PART OF THE
INSTITUTES OF THE LAWS OF ENGLAND; OR, A COMMENTARY UPON LITTLETON 1 (b) (Philadelphia,
Johnson, Warner & Fisher 1812); 4 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAWS OF
ENGLAND 67 (Univ. of Chi. Press 1979) (1769) (stating that the law of nations "is here adopted in it's
[sic] full extent by the common law"); Triquet v. Bath, (1764) 97 Eng. Rep. 936, 937-38 (K.B.).
86. HAMILTON LAW PRACTICE, supra note 78, at 329-30.
87. The pleadings are printed in id. at 318-30.
88. Id. at 413-17.
89. Id. at 416.
90. See KRAMER, supra note 1, at 65-66.
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military orders were no defense to a trespass action.91 The provision comes
at the end of the statute and is crystal clear. It is quite possible that the stat-
ute's drafters included it to defeat this conventional defense.
Duane most clearly embraced Hamilton's argument that the law of na-
tions operated directly on the legislature by way of Confederation law,
referring repeatedly to the "foederal compact."' 92 In short, the advocate and
judge went out of their way to constitutionalize the law of nations, and then
ignored a provision that might have removed the constitutional issue. It did
so, not just to obtain justice in this case, but also because New Yorkers
needed to learn respect for that law. Echoing Hamilton's "Phocion" letters,
Duane maintained that "in the infancy of our republic, every proper oppor-
tunity should be embraced to inculcate a sense of national obligation, and a
reverence for institutions, on which the tranquility of mankind, considered
as members of different states and communities depends. '93 Judicial ex-
amination of statutes was an opportunity to impart a civics lesson: New
Yorkers had to consider not just their own interests but also "national obli-
gation" and even "the tranquility of mankind." Applying the law of nations
served those ends. While the Mayor's Court did not explicitly claim the
power to nullify the statute, that is in effect what it did.
Members of the New York Assembly also saw it as judicial review
rather than statutory interpretation. A group of them concluded that the
court had "assumed and exercised a power to set aside an act of the state,"
and that it had "permitted the vague and doubtful custom of nations to be
plead against, and to render abortive, a clear and positive statute. '94 They
urged the landowner to seek a writ of error in the state supreme court, and
they encouraged voters to elect state senators who, when sitting on the
Council of Appointment, would select mayors and judges more respectful
of state legislation and thus "protect us against judicial tyranny."95
These state legislators were not alone in viewing Rutgers as an attempt
to nullify legislation. A decade later, leaders of the first federal administra-
tion interpreted Rutgers and the other examples of proto-judicial review in
the same way. When British diplomats complained in the early 1790s that
the states were still not adhering to the Peace Treaty, but rather had contin-
91. The statute is excerpted in HAMILTON LAW PRACTICE, supra note 78, at 201.
92. See, e.g.,id. at413.
93. Id. at 418.
94. Melancton Smith et al., An Address from the Committee Appointed at Mrs. Vandewater's on
the 13th Day of September, 1784, to the People of the State of New York 6 (Sept. 13, 1784) (italics in
original).
95. Id. at 14. The parties settled out of court. See Letter from Alexander Hamilton to Thomas
Jefferson (Apr. 19, 1792), in 11 THE PAPERS OF ALEXANDER HAMILTON 316, 317 (Harold C. Syrett &
Jacob E. Cooke eds., 1966).
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ued to confiscate land and pass other statutes in derogation of the loyalists'
rights, Secretary of State Thomas Jefferson cited Rutgers as "proof that the
courts consider the Treaty as paramount the laws of the States." The British
actually cited Rutgers first, arguing that the compromise decision, under
which the British merchant had to pay rent for the first three years of occu-
pancy, demonstrated that the states were violating the Peace Treaty. Dip-
lomats in London had received news of a decision in the New York City
Mayor's Court, proving that local antiloyalist litigation was an international
event. Throughout negotiations to secure British adherence to the treaty,
Jefferson wrote Hamilton and other New Yorkers to find out about New
York's Trespass Act and what had happened in Rutgers. Their reports em-
phasized the other half of the decision, the part that restrained or nullified
the statute in favor of the law of nations. Jefferson then appended Hamil-
ton's statement of the case to his official reply. 96 In international negotia-
tions, cases like Rutgers became the subject of controversy and, for U.S.
officials, served as evidence that the United States adhered to the law of
nations and the Peace Treaty.
Rutgers demonstrates the relationship between state court construction
of constitutional law and the project of reintegration. Adjudicative review
of statutes functioned not just as a brake on democracy or to serve elite
interests, though it could do both. It also demonstrated to the Atlantic em-
pires that the United States was an equal, law-abiding member of the civi-
lized world.
2. Holmes v. Walton (N.J. 1780): Nullifying the Enemy Seizure Act
of 1778
In Holmes, the New Jersey Supreme Court refused to apply the Enemy
Seizure Act, which permitted seizure of all goods in transit to or from en-
emy lines, against a defendant accused of trading with the British mili-
tary.97 The problem was that the statute provided defendants a jury of six
rather than twelve. The court reasoned that the common law always re-
quired a jury of twelve, not six.
96. See Letter from George Hammond to Thomas Jefferson (5 Mar. 1792), in 23 THE PAPERS OF
THOMAS JEFFERSON 196-220 (Charles T. Cullen ed., 1990) (discussing New York antiloyalist statutes
and citing Rutgers); Letter from Thomas Jefferson to George Hammond (May 29, 1792), in 23 THE
PAPERS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON, supra, at 551-63, 580. See also Letter from Alexander Hamilton to
Thomas Jefferson (April 19, 1792), in 23 THE PAPERS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON, supra, at 434-35 (de-
scribing Rutgers); Letter from Richard Harison to Thomas Jefferson (Dec. 4, 1790), in 18 THE PAPERS
OF THOMAS JEFFERSON 125-30 (Julian P. Boyd ed., 1971) (surveying New York's antiloyalist laws and
discussing Rutgers).
97. See Austin Scott, Holmes v. Walton: The New Jersey Precedent, 4 AM. HIST. REv. 456 (1899).
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The New Jersey constitution contained a standard common law recep-
tion clause that adopted so much of
the Common Law of England, as well as so much of the Statute-Law, as
have been heretofore practiced in this Colony, shall still remain in Force,
until they shall be altered by a future Law of the Legislature; such Parts
only excepted as are repugnant to the Rights and Privileges contained in
this Charter.98
The clause added that "the inestimable Right of Trial by Jury shall
remain confirmed, as a Part of the Law of this Colony without Repeal for-
ever."99 The constitution did not provide for a jury of twelve. That, how-
ever, was the traditional number of jurors in a common law jury, and the
court assumed that the constitution thus required a jury of twelve. The leg-
islature soon amended the statute to provide for a jury of twelve.
The court left no opinion. For present purposes, the case represents the
first instance of judicial review of a state statute. Apparently, the court
measured the statute against the state constitution, found that the former
violated the latter, and refused to apply it to the case at hand.
3. Bayard v. Singleton, North Carolina Supreme Court (1787): Nullifying
the Confiscation Act of 1785
Like almost all states, revolutionary North Carolina confiscated many
loyalist landholdings. A North Carolina statute protected buyers of confis-
cated estates from suits by loyalists, effectively preventing loyalists from
challenging those confiscations in court. 100 When the estate of an attainted
loyalist sued to repossess his land, the state supreme court refused to apply
the statute because it denied defendants a jury trial. 101 North Carolina's
constitution of 1776 provided that "in all controversies at law, respecting
property, the ancient mode of trial, by jury, is one of the best securities of
the rights of the people, and ought to remain sacred and inviolable."' 102 In
refusing to recognize the statute, the court placed much weight on the ex-
plicit guarantee. It explained that the legislators could not repeal the consti-
tutional guarantee "because if they could do this, they would at the same
instant of time, destroy their own existence as a Legislature, and dissolve
the government thereby established."'103
98. N.J. CONST. of 1776, art. XXII (italics in original).
99. Id.
100. See Bayard v. Singleton, I N.C. (Mart.) 5, 5 (1787).
101. Id. at 7.
102. N.C. CONST. of 1776, art. XIV, available at http://yale.edu/tawweb/avalon/states/nc07.htm.
103. Bayard, I N.C. (Mart.) at 7.
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James Iredell was counsel for the plaintiffs. Like Hamilton, Iredell
immigrated to the colonies from elsewhere in the British Empire (in his
case, from England in 1768). His practice during the 1780s in North Caro-
lina was also similar to Hamilton's in New York. Iredell represented sev-
eral loyalists in the courts, shepherded others through the petition process
in the state legislature, and gave advice to many more. 104 After serving as a
Federalist in the North Carolina ratification convention, he was appointed
to the United States Supreme Court in 1790, where he sat until his death in
1799.
In response to the public agitation over the North Carolina Supreme
Court's decision, Iredell published a pamphlet defending judicial review
that some scholars argue is the first full defense of the institution. 105 Iredell
referred to judicial review as the judges' duty to enforce only those laws
that are consistent with the constitution. "It will not be denied," Iredell
explained,
that the constitution is a law of the State, as well as an act of Assembly,
with this difference only, that it is the fundamental law, and unalterable
by the legislature, which derives all its power from it .... An act of As-
sembly cannot repeal the constitution, or any part of it. For that reason,
an act of Assembly, inconsistent with the constitution, is void, and can-
not be obeyed, without disobeying the superior law to which we were
previously and irrevocably bound. The judges, therefore, must take care
at their peril, that every act of Assembly they presume to enforce is war-
ranted by the constitution .... 1 0 6
After laying out the doctrine of judicial review, Iredell addressed the
claim that the people alone could enforce the constitution against unconsti-
tutional legislative action. He arrayed judicial review along a spectrum with
the instruments of customary constitutionalism. On the one hand, the right
to petition the legislature was insufficient because it supposes "that the
electors hold their rights by the favor of their representatives. The mere
stating of this is surely sufficient to excite any man's indignation."' 107 On
the other hand, the right of resistance was too "dreadful [an] expedient" to
protect the people from ordinary, legislative violations of the state constitu-
104. For information on Iredell's practice in the 1780s, see DON HIGGINBOTHAM, THE PAPERS OF
JAMES IREDELL (1976) (vols. I & 11), and LIFE AND CORRESPONDENCE OF JAMES IREDELL (Griffith J.
McRee ed., New York, D. Appleton & Co. 1857) (vols. I & II). For Iredell's contribution to judicial
review, see William R. Casto, James Iredell and the American Origins of Judicial Review, 27 CONN. L.
REV. 329 (1995), and John V. Orth, The Truth About Justice Iredell's Dissent in Chisholm v. Georgia
(1793), 73 N.C. L. REv. 255 (1994).
105. See, e.g., Snowiss, supra note 4, at 45-46.
106. James Iredell, To the Public (1786), in 2 LIFE AND CORRESPONDENCE OF JAMES IREDELL,
supra note 104, at 145, 148 (italics in original).
107. Id. at 147 (italics in original).
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tion.108 In any case, only "universal oppression" would incite such resis-
tance. 109 Iredell saw judicial review as an addition to these two alternatives,
though where exactly judicial review lay between them on that spectrum
was hard to say. Lawyers like Iredell and his opponents in the legislature
were debating just that question. Judicial review lay somewhere between
the petition and outright revolution, but closer to the former than the latter.
The North Carolina Supreme Court then decided that the defendants in
the confiscation case could plead that the plaintiff was an alien and thus
incapable of maintaining a real action based on inheritance. 110 This tended
to negate the right to jury trial won by loyalist landholders. (Of course,
unless the issue could be transformed into one of law for the court alone,
only sympathetic loyalists would have gained much by a jury trial anyway.)
The alienage rule was, however, ancient. The court could plausibly endorse
that rule without running afoul of the law of nations or the Peace Treaty.
The question of whether loyalists were aliens was debated throughout the
new states, and several held that they were-with hard consequences for
loyalists who tried to defend their landholdings in court. 111 In sum, the
North Carolina court protected loyalist rights under the state constitution,
but also found a traditional common law rule that made it difficult for them
to vindicate their land rights without first being naturalized by the state
legislature.
B. Criminal Statutes
1. The Case of Josiah Philips, Virginia Supreme Court (1778): Bypassing
the Act of Attainder of 1778
In the Philips case, the Virginia Supreme Court gave an "outlaw" a
jury trial rather than proceed under a legislative act of attainder. According
to a letter read in the Virginia legislature, the defendant had "commanded
an ignorant disorderly mob, in direct opposition to the measures of this
country [i.e., the revolutionary state of Virginia]." 112 Part of the complaint
108. Id.
109. Id. (italics in original).
110. Bayard, I N.C. (Mart.), at 9.
111. See William E. Nelson, The American Revolution and the Emergence of Modern Doctrines of
Federalism and Conflict of Laws, in LAW IN COLONIAL MASSACHUSETTS, 1630-1800, at 419, 447 n.9
(Daniel R. Coquillette ed., 1984) (contrasting Massachusetts and New Hampshire decisions on the
question). See also Letter from Phocion to the Considerate Citizens of New York, supra note 64 (op-
posing proposed bill in New York Assembly declaring loyalists as aliens). Article IX of the Jay Treaty
resolved this question in favor of the loyalists.
112. Trent, supra note 18, at 445.
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alleged that he was working in tandem with Lord Dunmore, the royal gov-
ernor of the province during the war. The act of attainder, said to be drafted
by Thomas Jefferson, accused Philips of being an "insurgent[]" who had
"levied war against this commonwealth."' 13 Attainder was warranted be-
cause the "delays" involved in the regular mode of outlawing a defendant
"according to the usual forms and procedures of the courts of law, would
leave the said good people for a long time exposed to murder and devasta-
tion." 114 Philips appears to have been one of many opportunists who pil-
laged the marchlands between the territories controlled by the royal and
revolutionary governments, respectively. 1 5 Still, the gravamen of the act of
attainder was his adherence to the Crown and his disruption of the revolu-
tionary cause. Although acts of attainder were common during the Revolu-
tion, they were rare in Virginia. There, the state legislature provided in
1775 that the usual "mode of punishment for the enemies to America"-
that is, to attaint and confiscate the property of loyalists-was to proceed
by jury trial. 116 The legislature singled out Philips for special treatment.
The state court, however, did not comply with the act of attainder. Instead,
it tried Philips for robbery in front of a jury of his peers-revolutionary
peers, at least. After Philips pleaded a commission from Dunmore in de-
fense, the jury found him guilty, and he was hanged."17
The question is why the court tried Philips at all. Was it because the
Virginia Attorney General disregarded the act of attainder and proceeded to
trial? Did he do so because he knew the court would not enforce the act?
Did the court persuade him to abandon the act? There is no clear evidence
for why the trial occurred. 18 But the state's legislative Bill of Rights of
1776 provided that all those accused of a crime had the right to receive a
113. Act to Attaint Josiah Philips and Others, Unless They Render Themselves to Justice Within a
Certain Time, ch. 12 (1778), in 9 THE STATUTES AT LARGE; BEING A COLLECTION OF ALL THE LAWS
OF VIRGINIA 463, 463-64 (William Waller Hening ed., photo. reprint 1969) (1821) [hereinafter
VIRGINIA STATUTES AT LARGE].
114. Id. at 463.
115. See Sung Bok Kim, The Limits of Politicization in the American Revolution: The Experience
of Westchester County, New York, 80 J. AM. HIST. 868 (1993) (describing the example of Westchester
County, New York).
116. Ordinance for Establishing a Mode of Punishment for the Enemies to America in This Colony,
ch. 7 (1775), in VIRGINIA STATUTES AT LARGE, supra note 113, at 101, 106 (providing jury trials "as
hath heretofore observed for the trial of civil causes in this colony"); amended by Ordinance to Amend
an Ordinance Entitled an Ordinance for Establishing a Mode of Punishment for the Enemies of America
in This Colony, ch. 7 (1776), in VIRGINIA STATUTES AT LARGE, supra note 113, at 130.
117. Trent, supra note 18, at 448.
118. See id. For a misinterpretation, see A.C. Goodell, Jr., Four Fugitive Cases from the Realm of
American Constitutional Law, 49 AM. L. REV. 818, 827 (1915) (arguing that because Philips was in
custody before the act became effective it did not apply, but misreading the dates in the statute to reach
this conclusion).
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jury trial.' 19 Presumably, this provision played a role in the course of the
Philips case. It is important to note, however, that the Virginia Constitution
and Bill of Rights of 1776 were passed by the Virginia legislature. Thus, if
the court assumed that the constitution was superior to statute law, it
probably drew on the customary constitutionalism of the colonial period as
reflected in the state constitution. In other words, the source of this higher
law remained ambiguous.
Within a generation, however, St. George Tucker referred to the case
as demonstrating "the importance of the separation of the powers of gov-
ernment, and of the independence of the judiciary; a dependent judiciary
might have executed the law, whilst they execrated the principles upon
which it was founded." 120 Tucker deemphasized the revolutionary context
of the Philips case. For him, the case stood for the abstract proposition that
the judiciary was independent of the legislature. In other words, he viewed
it as a precedent for judicial review in which a court went to trial despite a
statute eliminating that option. For present purposes, the point is that this
ambiguous incident turned on a decision by some attorney or judge--or
both-to bypass an act attainting a loyalist and to proceed instead to a jury
trial.
2. Commonwealth v. Caton, Virginia Supreme Court (1782): Examining,
but Upholding, the Treason Act of 1776
In Caton, the Virginia Supreme Court upheld Virginia's Treason Act
against the challenge that it violated the state constitution of 1776.121 The
statute provided that only the two houses of the state legislature, together,
could pardon a convicted traitor.122 In this case, the lower house voted to
pardon the defendants; the Senate refused. The lawyers arguing the case,
including Edmund Randolph and St. George Tucker, believed that the court
had the power to avoid or even strike down the statute because it violated
the state constitution of 1776. The constitution provided that the governor
had the power to pardon defendants except where the law directed other-
wise, "in which cases, no reprieve or pardon shall be granted, but by re-
solve of the House of Delegates."' 123 Here, the statute required a joint
resolution rather than just a resolution from the lower house. Tucker argued
119. VA. BILL OF RIGHTS § 8 (1776).
120. See BLACKSTONE'S COMMENTARIES app. at 293 (St. George Tucker ed., Philadelphia, Birch &
Small 1803) (appended comments by St. George Tucker).
121. Commonwealth v. Caton, 8 Va. (4 Call) 5 (1782).
122. Act Declaring What Shall Be Treason, ch. 3 (1776), in VIRGINIA STATUTES AT LARGE, supra




that the constitution "is the touchstone by which every Act of the legisla-
ture is to be tried. [I]f any Act thereof shall be found absolutely [and]
irreconcilably contradictory to the Constitution, it cannot admit of a Doubt
that such act is absolutely null and void."' 124
Most of the judges on the court agreed that they possessed the power
to strike down state legislation. But they found this statute constitutional. In
announcing their decision, the judges discussed the statute's constitutional-
ity at length-and confirmed their power to review it. Justice Wythe stated
the proposition most strongly:
[I]f the whole legislature... should attempt to overleap the bounds, pre-
scribed to them by the people, I, in administering the public justice of the
country, will meet the united powers, at my seat in this tribunal; and,
pointing to the constitution, will say, to them, here is the limit of your
authority; and, hither, shall you go, but no further.125
Caton has received much analysis, despite the fact that all references
to the judicial power to police violations of the constitution were dicta. But
what has again not been noted is that this case also involved defendants
loyal to the British Crown who had been convicted of treason under a state
law passed at the outset of the Revolution. In Virginia, as elsewhere, the
first articulate discussion of judicial review came in a heated case involving
the trial of loyalists who aided the British military.
C. Debtor-Creditor Statutes
The paper money and debt collection cases do not appear to have in-
volved loyalists. But debtor-creditor law was a lightning rod because it
affected interstate and international credit networks. The explicit purpose
of many revolutionary era debtor-creditor statutes was to make it difficult
for loyalist and British creditors to collect debts owed by patriots. Early
Americans, however, were not divided sharply into debtors and creditors.
Almost everyone involved in agriculture and trade was both. The real di-
vide was between debtors with in-state creditors, who could vote to force
these domestic creditors to accept paper money, and debtors with interstate
and international creditors, who could not force them to accept state paper
money. In this sense, the paper money and debt collection cases were about
whether there should be an interstate and international system of law and
credit, or whether each state would have its own.
In other words, the debt cases also raised the issue of whether the
states would reintegrate themselves into the Atlantic world. Paper money
124. Treanor, supra note 11, at 491 (italics in original).
125. Caton, 8 Va. (4 Call) at 8. For an exploration of Caton, see Treanor, supra note 18.
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fitted into a larger program of altering pre-revolutionary credit patterns.
Some of the colonies had long pushed for paper currency, but such schemes
were forbidden by Parliament and, when attempted, disallowed by the
Privy Council. 126 Now the states felt as though they had free rein to ex-
periment with paper money, interest moratoria, and debt cancellation.
Some of these experiments targeted the loyalists; all affected British credi-
tors at least indirectly.
1. Trevett v. Weeden, Rhode Island Supreme Court (1786): Refusing to
Enforce a Paper Money Act
In Trevett, a butcher refused to accept paper money as payment for
meat. The buyer brought an action against the butcher under a statute pro-
viding that those who rejected the state's legal tender could be convicted
without a jury trial, with the 100-pound penalty divided between the in-
former and the state. 127 The butcher's attorney, James Varnum, argued that
the act was "unconstitutional and void" because it established a "new-
fangled jurisdiction[]" and denied the jury trial, a "sacred right" brought
from England and still "the firm basis of our liberty."'1 28 The argument is
noteworthy because Rhode Island did not adopt a state constitution in the
revolutionary era. Like Connecticut, it retained its seventeenth-century
charter. That did not stop Varnum: the birthrights of Englishmen were im-
plicit in the charter, and the province was supposed to make no laws "con-
trary and repugnant unto" English law. 129 That clause had been enforced by
the Privy Council rather than the provincial courts, which Varnum did not
mention. Instead, he declared that it was the judiciary's duty not to make
law ('God forbid!'), but rather simply to ignore any statute that was
"against the constitution." 130 Once again, the constitutional argument de-
rived from the customary constitution that colonists had long interposed
against claims of imperial authority, whether made by the Crown, Parlia-
ment, or local imperial agents. Now such claims served to challenge state
legislative authority.
The state supreme court dismissed the case without judgment, which
suggested to most observers that it had refused to enforce the statute. Var-
num took the decision as a victory and claimed that others did too. The
126. JOSEPH ALBERT ERNST, MONEY AND POLITICS IN AMERICA, 1755-1775: A STUDY IN THE
CURRENCY ACT OF 1764 AND THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF REVOLUTION 24-30 (1973).
127. JAMES M. VARNUM, THE CASE, TREVETT AGAINST WEEDEN 1-2 (Providence, John Carter
1787).
128. Id. at 3, 14.




commercial consequences of the decision, he wrote when he published his
argument, were immediately apparent:
The shops and stores were generally opened, and business assumed a
chearful aspect. Few were the exceptions to a general congratulation, and
lavish indeed were the praises bestowed upon the Court. The dread and
the idea of informations were banished together, while a most perfect
confidence was placed in judicial security. The paper currency obtained
a more extensive circulation, as every one found himself at liberty to re-
ceive or refuse it. The markets, which had been illy supplied, were now
amply furnished, and the spirit of industry was generally diffused. Every
prospect teemed with returning happiness, and nothing appeared wanting
to restore union and harmony among the contending parties. 13
1
Rhode Island's legislators were less happy. They called the judges into
the legislature to explain "'their reasons for adjudging an act of the General
Assembly unconstitutional, and so void.""' 132 One judge responded that
they were answerable only to God and their consciences. He added that he
thought that the statute was "unconstitutional" and "could not be exe-
cuted."'1 33 The legislature began proceedings to address the judges out of
office. The judges responded that they held their offices by good behavior
tenure, as in England, and could only be impeached. Impeachment failed,
and the judges remained in office. 134 The important point here is that Var-
num rested his case on customary liberties, which he saw as means to ob-
tain ends that he identified as robust credit, industry, and markets.
2. New Hampshire "Ten Pound Act" Cases (1786): Refusal to Apply a
Summary Debt Collection Statute
In 1785, the New Hampshire legislature gave justices of the peace
summary jurisdiction to decide cases involving debts less then ten pounds
without jury trials. 135 The purpose was to aid debtors, who would reap the
benefit of less expensive process because the loser paid court costs and
summary bench trials were cheaper than jury trials. 136 The state's Bill of
Rights, adopted as Part II of the 1784 constitution, provided that all civil
causes involving at least two pounds were to receive jury trials. In addition,
the constitution declared that the legislature should not make laws "repug-
131. Id. at 37.
132. Id.
133. Id. at 38.
134. Id. at 53.
135. See Lambert, supra note 18, at 37.
136. See id. at 37-38 (describing "An Act for the Recovery of Small Debts in an Expeditious Way
and Manner").
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nant, or contrary to the constitution."1 37 It did not specify how this restric-
tion was to be enforced. 138
At least six New Hampshire courts, and possibly more, refused to en-
force this act in 1786. The judges expressed concern about "the first bud-
dings of Tyranny" and viewed the courts as "the constitutional Barriers
between the Power of the Legislature and the liberty of the People."'139
Lawyer William Plumer applauded the courts' decisions. He linked debtor
protection to the state's commercial recession: "Money scarce, business
dull and our Feeble government unhinged. [But] our courts of law are firm,
and in these degenerate days dare to be honest."' 140 Pro-debtor representa-
tives in the state legislature tried to impeach the judges who refused to
enforce the Ten Pound Act, but the committee appointed to investigate the
matter concluded that the judges should not be impeached. Instead, it called
for the act's repeal, which followed shortly.14 1
Legal historian William M. Treanor argues that because the New Jer-
sey, Rhode Island, North Carolina, and New Hampshire cases dealt with
denials of jury trials, and the New York case involved an evidentiary rule,
the best way to understand these cases is in structural terms: the courts
were policing the borders of their own branch against legislative infringe-
ment. 142 This quite possibly motivated some of the judges, though not all
of the judges expressed their reasons in these modem structural terms.
There were no doubt multiple causes for these cases, each of which alone
seems over-determining. But the anti-antiloyalist dimension remained
prominent over the next several years as Federalists reconstructed the fed-
eral Constitution and its judiciary.
There is also another way to understand the solicitude for juries. The
jury was one of the central symbols of the pre-revolutionary protest and of
claims for equal treatment as Britons. The imperial government's denials of
jury trials in the late colonial period had inspired both rebellion and the
frequent inclusion of jury trial guarantees in the state constitutions. 143
Strong embrace of the jury trial by state judges therefore served more than
137. Id. at 39.
138. Id.
139. Id. at 44 (italics in original).
140. Id. at 47.
141. ld. at 49-50.
142. Treanor, supra note 11, at 473-97. See also Michael J. Klarman, How Great Were the
"Great" Marshall Court Decisions?, 87 VA. L. REv. 1 I11, 1121 (2001) (arguing that early courts
"could invalidate only those laws that fell within the special purview of the judiciary"). But see
KRAMER, supra note 1, at 70 (observing that "it seems unlikely that anyone at the time was thinking in
these terms").
143. See HULSEBOSCH, CONSTITUTING EMPIRE, supra note 15, at 92-93, 114-22, 181-82.
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one purpose: it signaled vindication of hard-won liberties, and it also sig-
naled to audiences within the state and elsewhere that citizens of a republi-
can state offered (almost) everyone the full and equal enjoyment of the
"liberties of Englishmen."
VI. THE VIRTUES OF THE JUDICIAL SYSTEMS OF THE STATES
Many Federalists learned from these state cases that courts could play
a role in holding the states to extra-jurisdictional ideals. When John Jay, the
Confederation's Secretary for Foreign Affairs, again asked state legislators
to repeal laws violating the Peace Treaty in early 1787, Hamilton submitted
a motion in the New York Assembly to repeal the part of the Trespass Act
that violated the law of nations. 144 Later that spring, the Continental Con-
gress passed a resolution and sent a circular letter to the state legislators
asking them to repeal all laws repugnant to the treaty, without specifying
which laws were repugnant, and then directing state courts to decide cases
arising under suspect statutes "according to the true intent and meaning" of
the treaty. 145 A few days later, Hamilton introduced a bill into the New
York Assembly that simply declared all laws inconsistent with the Peace
Treaty to be repealed. In response to complaints that a general repeal gave
judges too much discretion to locate violations, Hamilton "insisted that
their powers would be the same, whether this law was passed or not. For,
that as all treaties were known by the constitution as the laws of the land,
so must the judges act on the same, any law to the contrary notwithstand-
ing." He then expressed a new justification for judicial review that revealed
his dissatisfaction with Mayor Duane's compromising logic in Rutgers:
Cicero... lays it down as a rule, that when two laws clash, that which
relates to the most important matters ought to be preferred. If this rule
prevails, who can doubt what would be the conduct of the judges, should
any laws exist inconsistent with the treaty of peace: But it would be im-
politic to leave them to the dilemma, either of infringing the treaty to en-
force the particular laws of the state, or to explain away the laws of the
state to give effect to the treaty.
146
144. Motion That a Committee Be Appointed to Consider a Letter from the Secretary for Foreign
Affairs (Jan. 23, 1787), in 4 HAMILTON PAPERS, supra note 80, at 21-22; Remarks on an Act for Re-
pealing Part of the Trespass Act (Mar. 21, 1787), in 4 HAMILTON PAPERS, supra note 80, at 121.
145. 32 JOURNALS OF THE CONTINENTAL CONGRESS, 1774-1789, at 124-25, 179 (Roscoe R. Hill
ed., 1936) (proceedings of Mar. 21, 1787, and Apr. 13, 1787), available at
http://memory.loc.gov/ammem/amlaw/lwjclink.html (follow "Volume 32 (pp. 1-384)" hyperlink; then
follow "Page image" hyperlink).
146. Remarks on an Act Repealing Laws Inconsistent with the Treaty of Peace (Apr. 17, 1787), in
4 HAMILTON PAPERS, supra note 80, at 150, 152.
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On the eve of the Philadelphia Convention, the Legislature passed the bill.
At the same time, Hamilton was developing a fuller conception of judicial
review.
After the Convention, Hamilton elaborated on judicial review in Fed-
eralist Nos. 22 and 78. He praised the state courts in Federalist No. 78 for
helping to constrain the state legislatures by remarking that "[t]he benefits
of the integrity and moderation of the judiciary have already been felt in
more states than one; and though they may have displeased those whose
sinister expectations they may have disappointed, they must have com-
manded the esteem and applause of all the virtuous and disinterested." He
did not analyze exactly what those courts had done or call it judicial re-
view. Instead, he stated only that they were "mitigating the severity, and
confining the operation" of "unjust and partial laws." But he was implicitly
referring to the examples of strong statutory construction and nullification
of the prior decade, including Rutgers. The benefit of an independent judi-
ciary came not just in episodic adjudication. It also "operates as a check
upon the legislative body ... who, perceiving that obstacles to the success
of an iniquitous intention are to be expected from the scruples of the
courts," would redraft their bills accordingly. 147 Judges were schoolmasters
for legislators and the people. 1
48
In Federalist No. 22, Hamilton also linked federal judicial review to
this cause of negotiating in strength with the European empires. Those
empires had so far found it "unwise" to make treaties with the United
States because such agreements "might at any moment be violated by its
members." 149 A federal judiciary was needed to "avoid the confusion
which would unavoidably result from the contradictory decisions of a
number of independent judicatories." Without uniform interpretations of
treaties, "foreign nations can [n]either respect [n]or confide in such a gov-
ernment." 150 Useful as they were, state courts alone were insufficient. The
upshot for Hamilton of recent experience in the states was that courts-all
courts-were integral to the Federalist program. By the period of ratifica-
tion, Federalists had come to view the state courts as actors that could help
restrain the state legislatures, albeit supporting actors in a drama that fo-
cused on reconstructing the federal arrangement.
147. THE FEDERALIST No. 78 (Alexander Hamilton), supra note 72, at 528.
148. See generally Ralph Lemer, The Supreme Court as Republican Schoolmaster, 1967 SUP. CT.
REV. 127.
149. THE FEDERALIST No. 22 (Alexander Hamilton), supra note 72, at 136.
150. Id. at 144. Cf. FEDERAL CONVENTION RECORDS, supra note 69, at 308 (Hamilton arguing that




The Federalists also learned that they could demand even more sup-
port from the courts than they had already received-especially from fed-
eral courts. This applied learning did not end with ratification. Section 25
of the Judiciary Act of 1789 enacted what Hamilton had desired in Feder-
alist No. 22: the Supreme Court would have the power to "re-examine[]"
final judgments in state courts that turned on "the validity of a treaty or
statute of' the United States, or that turned on the validity of a state statute
bearing on the federal Constitution, federal treaties, or federal law.151 Crit-
ics immediately grasped that, without any jurisdictional minimum, the
clause would "embrace the Case of every British Creditor[.] And is it in-
tended that they may drag every [debtor] for the most trifling sum first
thro' the State Courts & then by Appeal to the seat of Congress[?]"' 152
No-just to the seat of the Supreme Court. And that seems to have been the
drafters' intention. Oliver Ellsworth, the primary drafter of the Judiciary
Act, specified that the Supreme Court would have jurisdiction to review
state cases that upheld state statutes against claims that they violated fed-
eral law or treaties, but not cases in which state courts struck down state
law for violating federal law. In the latter cases, state citizens could not
complain of bias. In other words, he assumed that a key purpose of the
federal courts was to protect the out-of-state American citizens and for-
eigners from state courts, especially their juries. He reportedly believed that
the delegates to the Philadelphia Convention
had in view the condition of foreigners when they framed the Judicial of
the U. States. The Citizens were already protected by [the State] Judges
& Courts, but foreigners were not. The Laws of nations & Treaties were
too much disregarded in the several States. Juries were too apt to be bi-
ased agst. them, in favor of their own citizens & acquaintances: it was
therefore necessary to have general Courts for causes in wch foreigners
were parties or citizens of [different] States .... 153
For Ellsworth, even the Supremacy Clause's injunction to state courts
was insufficient to protect "foreigners." The handful of state cases offering
some protection were outweighed by the many more in which state courts
and juries had not vindicated the law of nations and treaties. Accordingly,
in the first instance of federal judicial review of state legislation, a federal
court struck down a private bill granting a moratorium to a debtor as violat-
151. Act of Sept. 24, 1789, § 25, ch. 20, 1 Stat. 73, 85-86 (establishing United States judicial
courts).
152. Commentary from Edmund Pendleton to James Madison (July 3, 1789), in 4 THE
DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES, 1789-1800: ORGANIZING
THE FEDERAL JUDICIARY: LEGISLATION AND COMMENTARIES 444, 448 (Maeva Marcus ed., 1992)
[hereinafter 4 ORGANIZING THE FEDERAL JUDICIARY].
153. Commentary from William Loughton Smith to Edward Rutledge (Aug. 9-10, 1789), in 4
ORGANIZING THE FEDERAL JUDICIARY, supra note 152, at 496, 498-99.
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ing the Contract Clause at the request of British creditors. 154 In the federal
courts, judicial review of state legislation for the benefit of Britons became
uncontroversial.
Among the diplomats, it was also useful. When in late 1789 George
Beckwith, who was Britain's unofficial minister to the United States, told
Secretary of the Treasury Alexander Hamilton that it was time "to settle
any matters, that may be supposed to respect the Treaty of Peace, still un-
adjusted," Hamilton agreed that it was indeed "proper."' 155 Only two British
complaints, Hamilton thought, remained. The first concerned state paper
money laws that depreciated debts owed Britons, which the treaty promised
would be repaid in "full value in sterling money."'156 This problem was
"done away by the present Government, which has paid the most particular
attention to this, in the formation and Establishment of its Judiciary branch;
the District Courts will be in immediate operation, the Supreme Court very
shortly."'157 Hamilton did not simply point to the prohibition on state cur-
rency in Article I, Section 10.158 Instead, he invoked the judicial power to
enforce the Constitution, as realized in the Judiciary Act of 1789. The sec-
ond outstanding issue-state confiscation of loyalist property-was more
complicated. Here Hamilton reminded the Briton that the Peace Treaty
forbade only confiscations after the treaty, and there had been few of these.
As far as restitution for confiscations during the war, Article V was "rec-
ommendatory" rather than mandatory.159 It would take another controver-
sial treaty negotiated by John Jay, and several years after that, before the
Supreme Court finally enforced this prohibition against the states. 16
0
CONCLUSION
The experience of the loyalists presents a useful test for Larry
Kramer's argument that the founding generation intended for the American
154. This 1792 case, Champion & Dickason v. Casey, is discussed in Treanor, supra note 11, at
518-19.
155. Conversation with George Beckwith (Oct. 1789), in 5 THE PAPERS OF ALEXANDER HAMILTON
482, 486 (Harold C. Syrett & Jacob E. Cooke eds., 1962). See Peace Treaty of 1783, arts. V and VI.
(Direct quote: Beckwith, note 148 at P. 486).
156. Definitive Treaty of Peace Between the United States of America and his Britannic Majesty,
U.S.-Gr. Brit., art. IV, Sept. 3, 1783, 8 Stat. 80.
157. Conversation with George Beckwith, supra note 155, at 486-87.
158. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 10.
159. Conversation with George Beckwith, supra note 155, at 487.
160. See Martin v. Hunter's Lessee, 14 U.S. (1 Wheat.) 304 (1816) (exercising review over state
supreme court judgment under section 25 of Judiciary Act to measure state forfeiture legislation against
the 1783 Peace Treaty). On the Jay treaty, see generally SAMUEL FLAGG BEMIS, JAY'S TREATY: A
STUDY 1N COMMERCE AND DIPLOMACY (2d ed. 1962).
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people to rely primarily on the customary instruments of popular constitu-
tionalism to interpret and enforce their constitutions. It largely supports his
thesis because even the loyalists practiced popular constitutionalism before,
during, and after the Revolution, in North America and in Britain. But the
loyalist experience also demonstrates the limits of Kramer's historical ar-
gument and explains why at least some Americans began to demand a
stronger role for judges in the construction of constitutions. Loyalists were
like canaries in the coal mine: they were the first to suffer under localist
legislation, but in the long run all would suffer-so thought those, at least,
who could not imagine life outside the Atlantic world. Most Americans,
however, had a different-also historically rooted-vision of how to treat
the enemy in a civil war. In that vision, disloyal members of the polity were
expropriated and banished. Neither vision predominated. Elements of both
succeeded in the wake of the Revolution. But one upshot from the struggle
between them was a new perception of the role that courts could play in
policing legislative adherence to constitutions. An important by-product
was the power that judicial review gave lawyers and judges to define con-
stitutional law.
The anti-antiloyalist origins of judicial review, or more positively, its
pro-Atlantic world origins, help explain why judicial review began to
emerge when it did. Judicial review had some antecedents and models in
English legal culture and imperial governance. But it has remained some-
thing of a mystery why the institution emerged in the 1780s and why so
many people embraced the power of judges to set aside legislation by the
time Congress passed the Judiciary Act of 1789. If one focuses on the do-
mestic scene, it remains a puzzle that begs some socio-political explanation
like the birth of a new aristocracy, elites against populists, partisan strug-
gle, and so forth. If one steps back and looks at British imperial history, the
idea of central institutions reviewing local ones seems almost inevitable,
and the problem to explain is why so many state legislators could not ac-
cept that inevitability. But if one focuses on the intermediate range pic-
ture--on the states as they emerged from a British civil war and before they
adopted the federal Constitution-and sees thirteen hapless provinces on
the edge of a continent, yet who had the hubris to call themselves together
in a Continental Congress, and who declared their independence and col-
lective equality with the Atlantic empires, 16 1 sought wartime alliances with
a few of those empires, and after the war tried to renew commercial rela-
tions with Europe, judicial review begins to make sense as a strategy for
161. For the diplomatic function of the Declaration, see generally David Armitage, The Declaration
ofIndependence and International Law, 59 WM. & MARY Q. 39 (2002).
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achieving international reintegration. When there was no strong central
government, a handful of advocates and judges inserted the state courts into
the vacuum of authority.
For Federalists, constitution-making was always relational. The point
of establishing a self-governing polity was to ensure that it did not remain
alone in the world, whether on the continent or in the surrounding envi-
ronment of European empires. For them, the emergent genre of constitu-
tional law was not just about restraining majorities and protecting
minorities. It was about also fitting local, temporary majorities into a much
larger world full of many more people. That was the original premise of
judicial review as it was the premise of the political and cultural movement
soon called Federalism. It was a contested premise. These precursors of
judicial review of legislation were not exercises of popular sovereignty in
the sense of vindicating the popular will against corrupt legislators or ex-
ecutives. They were not happy instances of holding the people to their bet-
ter wills, whatever that might mean. They were hardly last stands before
revolution. Instead, they were instances of lawyers using the tools at hand
to wrest free outcomes that best served their clients and what they thought
the people should want and perhaps might want if they knew all the facts to
calculate their collective interest. From the beginning, judicial review of-
fered an end-run around legislation.
Once created, judicial review could serve many interests and goals.
Only jurisdiction, judicial tact, and public acceptance would limit the
claims that parties could make and that judges could endorse in the
courts. 162 But it began as a way for some parties to overcome local majori-
ties to safeguard their lives and property. Those loyalists found a sympa-
thetic hearing among young lawyers and some state judges who wanted to
realize a particular vision of the Union. Deft diplomacy could prevent the
old empires from divvying up this new pretender; healthy foreign relations
required domestic diplomacy and reform, too. Kramer is correct that judi-
cial review was not the central plank of this reform in the 1780s; the writ-
ing and ratification of the federal Constitution of 1787 was. But judicial
review was part of the reform package. It existed from the beginning in an
uneasy relationship with the principle of local representation, and it func-
tioned to vindicate extra-jurisdictional interests and ideals-federal and
transatlantic interests and ideals.
162. This is a key upshot of BARRY FRIEDMAN, NEITHER FORCE NOR WILL: HOW THE COURT
BECAME SUPREME (forthcoming 2008).
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More work on the causes of.the origins of judicial review-and the
power of early American judges generally163-should relocate judicial
review, not back to the center of early American constitutional history, but
at least back in from the periphery to which some enthusiasts of popular
constitutionalism would banish it. Fitting judicial review into the variety of
strategies Federalists used to reintegrate the states with each other and into
the Atlantic world will help generate a neo-orthodox understanding of its
important place in early American constitutionalism. In the 1780s, the
American constitutions had domestic and international audiences. The
plight of the loyalists, who lived in the borderland between those two con-
stituencies, made some revolutionaries see that their constitutions should
serve both.
163. This essay has not addressed this important question. For an overview of the issue, see gener-
ally, Wood, supra note 5. For detailed examination in one state, see JOHN PHILLIP REID, CONTROLLING
THE LAW: LEGAL POLITICS IN EARLY NATIONAL NEW HAMPSHIRE (2004). See also JOHN PHILLIP REID,
LEGISLATING THE COURTS: JUDICIAL DEPENDENCE DURING THE ERA OF THE EARLY REPUBLIC (forth-
coming, 2007). For research casting doubt on the conventional thesis that colonial judges were weak,
see William E. Nelson, Government by Judiciary: The Growth of Judicial Power in Colonial Pennsyl-
vania 59 SMU L. REv. 3 (2006).
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APPENDIX
Table. Judicial Review: Early State Cases.
Case Loyalist Statute Court's 
Action Legislative
Defendant Backlash
Philips Yes Act of Attainder Tried defendant by jury rather Yes
(1778)
Yes Trading with Enemy
Act (1778)
Yes Treason Act (1776)
Yes Trespass Act (1783)
No Paper Money Forcing
Act (1786)




1. Petitions against the decision were read in the legislature.
2. The House tried to revise the act to vest sole pardon power in itself, the Senate did not concur.
than enforce legislative convic-
tion
Held that statute denied jury trial
as required by constitution
Held that constitution only limits
pardon to House when House
brings prosecution. Narrow
construction of constitution to
uphold statute; three judges
claimed power to strike statutes
Upheld law of nations rule that
military order is a defense to
trespass action
Case dismissed; three judges
asserted power to reform statute
based on constitution's pardon
provision
Held that statute denied jury trial
as required by constitution
Held that constitution requires
















866 CHICAGO-KENTLAWREVIEW [Vol 81:825
3. The Assembly passed a resolve against the decision; there was also an unsuccessful attempt to
remove Judge Duane and Recorder Varick.
4. The judges were questioned before the legislature; those who claimed power to strike were not
reappointed.
5. The House voted to reaffirm the constitutionality of the act, but after a failed motion to im-
peach the judges, it repealed the act.
6. The Assembly authorized an inquiry into the state of the courts and the administration of
justice; there was talk of impeachment, but none actually occurred.
